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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress has determined, as the complex statutory pattern of
subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code evidences, that share-
holders must treat distributions out of current or accumulated
earnings and profits made by an ongoing corporation as ordinary
income regardless of the distribution's characterization.1 Con-
* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; Associate Editor, Mer-
tens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law,
1964; L.L.M., Lawyer's Institute, The John Marshall Law School, 1968.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Diane I. Jennings, clerk to The
Hon. John J. Sullivan, Illinois Appellate Court, First District; J.D., The John Marshall Law
School, 1982.
1. I.R.C. §§ 61, 301, 312, 316. All references and citations to sections in this article are
to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended to the date of publication,
unless otherwise indicated. All references and citation to regulations are to Treasury regula-
tions under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended to the date of publication,
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versely, amounts distributed to shareholders upon the termination
of all 2 or a substantial part s of the corporation's business opera-
tions, or in exchange for all4 or a substantial part5 of a share-
unless otherwise indicated. Although the scope of this article is limited to the liquidation-
reincorporation transaction, an understanding and resolution of that problem requires con-
sideration of the broader context of the overall statutory framework. For a discussion of the
above provisions and their complexities, see S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H.
AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 287-435 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as SURREY & WAR-
REN]; O'Kelley, Corporate Distributions and the Income Tax: A Consideration of the In-
consistency Between Subchapter C and Its Underlying Policy, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1981);
see also Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and
Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 94 (1977) (suggesting the Code is the product of a three-step evolu-
tionary process: enactment of general rules, efforts by taxpayers to circumvent those rules,
and reaction by the Internal Revenue Service to the tax-avoidance schemes).
2. I.R.C. § 331(a), (b). Complete termination, or liquidation, of a corporation has never
been precisely defined. One court has attempted to characterize the event as follows: "The
corporation must have ceased to be a going corporation concern. . . . If the liquidated busi-
ness is not resumed by the new corporation as a continuation of a going concern, there is a
'complete liquidation.'" Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35, 41 (4th Cir. 1965).
For a comprehensive discussion of Pridemark, see Ordower, Separating Statutory
Frameworks: Incompatibility of the Complete Liquidation and Reorganization Provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 9 (1981). See generally Bittker & Eus-
tice, Complete Liquidations and Related Problems, 26 TAX L. REV. 191 (1971).
3. I.R.C. § 302(e)(1) (defines partial liquidation as a distribution essentially different
from a dividend-determined at the corporate level-and in redemption of a part of the
corporation's stock). The courts and the Service have defined "not essentially equivalent to
a dividend" to mean a distribution resulting from a genuine contraction of corporate busi-
ness. See Mains v. United States, 508 F.2d 1251, 1255 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
981 (1978); Blaschka v. United States, 393 F.2d 983, 984 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Rev. Rul. 74-296,
1974-1 C.B. 80; infra note 50. Sections 302(e)(2) and 302(e)(3) provide a safe harbor under
the contraction requirement. If the distribution results from the termination of a business
that has been actively conducted for five years and immediately thereafter the distributing
corporation is conducting another business that has been actively conducted for five years,
such distribution is deemed to be not essentially equivalent to a dividend. Neither business
could have been obtained in a taxable transaction in the five year. period prior to the re-
demption. This latter limitation prevents a bailout of earnings and profits when the distrib-
uting corporation uses its excess liquid assets to acquire a business and then distributes
shares in the acquired corporation or the proceeds from its sale to the shareholders. These
provisions are an example of the complexity necessary to achieve Congress's intended dis-
tinction between dividend and capital gains treatment. I.R.C. §§ 302(e)(2)-(3). Sections
302(a) and 302(b)(4), in conjunction, allow capital gains treatment of distributions that have
the earmarks of distributions that would normally give rise to dividend treatment: pro rata
distribution, current or accumulated earnings and profits, and continued existence of an
active corporation. The lack of specificity of the "not essentially equivalent to a dividend"
standard has prompted criticism from many commentators because of the potential for
bailout of corporate earnings and profits. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS V 9.52, at 9-65 (4th ed. 1979) ("recognizing
its potential for disguising ordinary distributions as partial liquidations is the first step to-
ward consciously policing the concept").
4. I.R.C. § 302(a), (b)(3) (stock redemptions completely terminating the shareholder's
interest). The potential for avoiding the required termination of control where the share-
holders are closely connected and have a common economic interest led Congress to enact a
[Vol. 38:231
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holder's proprietary interest, are considered receipts from the sale
or exchange of the shareholder's stock. The government taxes any
gains on such exchanges at the significantly lower effective rates
imposed on capital gains.7 Granting capital gains treatment to
shareholders receiving liquidating distributions provides a strong
incentive for the extraction of liquid and other nonoperating assets
at the lower effective capital gains rates without interruption of the
corporation's business. To the extent that this can be accom-
plished, the taxpayer frustrates congressional purpose and receives
unintended benefits.8
Several provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) are
specifically designed to prevent circumventing its broad statutory
framework. These are:
1. Accumulated Earnings Tax. This tax bolsters the provi-
sions relating to dividend distributions. It is a penalty tax imposed
series of rules for ascribing constructive ownership to shareholders. I.R.C. §§ 302(c), 318.
Since the attribution rules would make it impossible for a shareholder to terminate his in-
terest in a family corporation, Congress also provided for a waiver of the family attribution
rules where the retiring shareholder agrees not to acquire an "interest" in the corporation
for a 10-year period. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted
in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4676.
5. A stock redemption that is "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" or that is "sub-
stantially disproportionate" shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in
exchange for stock." I.R.C. § 302(a), (b)(1)-(2). The Code provides a mechanical test for
determining what is substantially disproportionate (immediately after the redemption the
shareholder owns less than 50% of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote and his ratio of ownership of such stock after the redemption is less than
80% of his ratio of ownership prior to the redemption. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2). The Supreme
Court has interpreted the "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" test of subsection (b)(1)
to require a "meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corpo-
ration." United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970). This has generated considerable
commentary. See, e.g., Postlewaite & Finneran, Section 302(b)(1): The Expanding Minnow,
64 VA. L. REV. 561 (1978); Randall, Recent Interpretations of the "Meaningful Reduction"
Test of I.R.C. Section 302(b)(1), 1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 253. Although section 302(e)(1)(A)
employs similar language, see supra note 3, section 302(b)(1) refers to a contraction in inter-
est at the shareholder level, while section 302(e) concerns contraction at the corporate level.
The relationship between section 302(b)(1) and 302(e)'s predecessor, section 346, is dis-
cussed in SURREY & WARREN, supra note 1, at 502-04.
6. I.R.C. §§ 302(a), (b)(4) (redemptions in partial liquidation), 331(a) (liquidations).
7. Commencing in 1982, the maximum rate of taxation on any kind of income was low-
ered from 70% to 50%. I.R.C. § 1. As a result, the maximum effect rate on long-term capital
gains was reduced from 28% to 20%, only 40% of the gains being subject to tax. I.R.C. §
1202. Although the maximum disparity in effective rates between ordinary income and capi-
tal gains has been reduced from 42% (70-28) to 30% (50-20), the difference is still too sub-
stantial to anticipate any decline in taxpayer attempts to "bailout" corporate earnings and
profits at capital gains rates whenever the opportunity arises.
8. Various provisions of the 1954 Code designed to remove loopholes conducive to tax
avoidance exemplify legislative reaction to attempts to circumvent the statutory framework.
See infra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
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on successful corporations that fail to distribute current income
when they have accumulated earnings and profits in excess of rea-
sonable anticipated business needs.'
2. Redemptions. Stringent rules prevent the bailout of earn-
ings and profits at capital gains rates through a stock redemption.
To prevent circumvention of these rules by a shareholder's pur-
ported sale of stock in one corporation to a related corporation, the
Code makes the same rules applicable to certain sales accom-
plished through transactions in the stock of brother-sister or par-
ent-subsidiary corporations. 0
3. Preferred Stock Bailouts. To prevent a bailout of corporate
earnings with preferred stock issued as a dividend or pursuant to a
reorganization, section 306 provides for dividend treatment on the
sale or redemption of such stock in specified situations."
4. Corporate Divisions. The stringent requirements of section
355, which must be met to effectuate a tax-free distribution, pre-
vent the use of corporate divisions to bail out corporate profits.'
5. Boot Distributions in Reorganizations. Property other than
stock or securities permitted to be received without recognition of
gain in a reorganization may give rise to dividend treatment. 3
6. Carryover of Earnings and Profits. Section 381 prevents the
elimination of an earnings and profits account in a reorganization
or a liquidation of a subsidiary under section 332.'"
7. Detailed constructive ownership rules apply to specific
transactions to serve the purpose of some of the above provisions.' 6
One type of bailout that has escaped specific statutory treat-
ment is the so-called liquidation-reincorporation "device,"'" a se-
9. I.R.C. §§ 531-37.
10. I.R.C. §§ 302, 304.
11. I.R.C. § 306, see infra note 25.
12. I.R.C. § 355.
13. I.R.C. § 356, see infra notes 123-42 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
characterizing boot as dividend or capital gain under section 356, see B. BITTKER & J. Eus-
TICE, supra note 3, 14.34.
14. I.R.C. § 381, see infra note 37.
15. I.R.C. § 302, 304, 306, 318, 356(a)(2).
16. It is somewhat misleading to employ the term "device," since a bona fide business
purpose, not tax-avoidance concerns, could motivate a transaction fitting this description.
See, e.g., Rose v. United States, 640 F.2d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 1981) ("once a sale and liqui-
dation meets the technical requirements of § 368(a)(1)(D), it can be reclassified as a Section
D reorganization without the necessity of the Government showing that the transaction was
structured as a sale and liquidation to receive more favorable tax treatment"). The facts in
most reported cases indicate, however, that tax avoidance is either the sole or the primary
motivation for framing the transaction as a liquidation-reincorporation. E.g., Davant v.
Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874, 881 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
[Vol. 38:231
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ries of transactions designed to provide the taxpayer with various
tax benefits. There are two main forms of the liquidation-
reincorporation device. The most direct form involves liquidating
one corporation and distributing the assets in kind to its share-
holders. 17 Accompanying the distribution, there is a simultaneous
transfer 8 to a newly formed corporation of the operating assets
and sufficient working capital to maintain uninterrupted opera-
tions. The shareholders typically retain the liquid and passive in-
vestment assets. The new or surviving corporation may or may not
have the same shareholders whose proportionate interest may or
may not remain constant. The degree of change in ownership sig-
nificantly affects the tax treatment afforded these transactions.19
Another form of the liquidation-reincorporation device employs
brother-sister corporations.20 The operating assets of one corpora-
tion are sold to the other for cash, which its shareholders have con-
tributed to the newly formed corporation.21 The liquidation of the
selling corporation follows the asset sale. Here also, there is no in-
terruption of business, no substantial change in employees, and, in
most cases, no significant change in stock ownership.
A literal application of relevant provisions of the Code to these
17. See, e.g., Kelly v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 141 (1928); Nicholson, Liquidation-
reincorporation, TAX MGMT. (BNA) No. 335, at A-1 (1976).
18. While the transfers usually occur simultaneously, a transaction may constitute a
liquidation-reincorporation even if it does not result in an immediate transfer. See, e.g.,
Anniston Soil Pipe Co. V. Patterson, 56-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9613 (N.D. Ala.) (liquida-
tion followed by organization of a new corporation less than a month later by the same
shareholders was a reorganization).
19. See infra notes 96-122 and accompanying text.
20. In this context the term is used to denote two corporations with significant common
ownership. As in the case of a liquidation followed by a reincorporation, the percentage of
common ownership is significant.
21. The shareholders form the surviving corporation for the purpose of purchasing the
assets of the old corporation and continuing its business. E.g., Gallagher v. Commissioner,
39 T.C. 144 (1962). The shareholders' cash contribution is usually transitory: the liquidating
corporation distributes the purchase price for the assets to the shareholders as a liquidating
dividend. Since the various transactions often take place simultaneously (usually in a law-
yer's office), the investment in the second corporation is never at risk. If the shareholders do
not have ready cash, outside financing is usually available from an institutional lender for a
small fee. The lender may require personal guarantees by the shareholders and the shares of
the original corporation as collateral for repayment. Following or simultaneously with the
sale, the shareholders liquidate the selling corporation and use the proceeds to repay the
loan. Any excess, of course, is retained by the shareholders.
The shareholders, however, may accomplish the same result through a purchase by a
preexisting corporation having common ownership. See, e.g., Davant v. Commissioner, 366
F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967); American Mfg. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 55 T.C. 204 (1970) (one of two wholly owned subsidiaries sold its operating assets to
the other and liquidated).
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transactions will produce substantial tax benefits. The most signifi-
cant advantage is that any excess liquid assets, which the share-
holders receive from the liquidating corporation and do not trans-
fer to the new or continuing corporation, are subject only to the
tax on long-term capital gains.2 The surviving corporation obtains
tax benefits by receiving a stepped-up basis for its assets,2 3 even
though the business has continued uninterrupted with little or no
change in shareholder interest. Other advantages include the elimi-
nation of the earnings and profits account of the liquidating corpo-
ration2 4 and the ability to issue preferred stock and debt instru-
ments of the surviving corporation without adverse tax
consequences.2 5 In addition, when the taxpayer employs brother-
22. Section 1222 defines a capital gain as "gain derived from the sale or exchange of a
capital asset." I.R.C. § 1222. Section 331(a) provides that "[a]mounts received by a share-
holder in a distribution in complete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in full
payment in exchange for the stock." I.R.C. § 331(a). The liquidating corporation recognizes
no gain or loss on the distribution in liquidation. I.R.C. § 336(a).
23. When the old corporation liquidates, followed by a transfer of the operating assets
to a new corporation, the stepped-up basis is obtained through the interplay of sections 334,
351, and 362. Under section 334(a), the basis of the assets received by the shareholders
pursuant to a complete liquidation where gain or loss is recognized is the assets' fair market
value at the time of distribution. I.R.C. § 334(a). When the shareholders transfer the operat-
ing assets to the new corporation, the transaction qualifies for tax-free treatment under sec-
tion 351. I.R.C. § 351(a). Section 362 provides that the basis of property received in a trans-
action to which section 351 applies is the same as in the hands of the transferors, increased
in the amount of any gain recognized to the transferor on such transfer. I.R.C. § 362(a).
Normally no gain would be recognized on the reincorporation unless, in addition to stock,
the corporation issues short-term debt instruments, which do not qualify as securities under
section 351. When the shareholder uses brother-sister corporations, the transferee or
purchasing corporation obtains a cost (usually fair market value) basis under section 1012.
The obvious advantage of a stepped-up basis is that the depreciable assets will provide
larger deductions for depreciation, and all assets will generate a smaller gain or larger loss
on disposition.
24. In this situation the Code does not provide for the carryover of the earnings and
profits account from the old to the new corporation. Section 381, which does provide for
such carryover, only applies to a liquidation of a subsidiary under section 332(b)(1) or a
statutory reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(A), (C), (D), (F) or (G).
25. Under section 306, certain issues of preferred stock will give rise to ordinary income
on sale or redemption. In direct response to Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954), Congress enacted section 306 to "close a possi-
ble loophole . . . known as the 'preferred stock bail-out.'" S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Congress,
2d Sess. 46, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4676. Preferred stock
issued when a new corporation is formed would not carry the section 306 taint (the defini-
tion of section 306 stock presupposes the existence of earnings and profits) and would give
rise to capital gains treatment on subsequent sale. I.R.C. § 1222. See generally Lowe,
Bailouts: Their Role in Corporate Planning, 30 TAx L. REV. 357 (1975). Shareholders may
receive long-term debt instruments that qualify as securities without adverse tax conse-
quences on incorporation. I.R.C. § 351. If debt instruments are received from an ongoing
corporation either as a direct distribution or pursuant to a reorganization, dividend treat-
ment may result. I.R.C. §§ 301, 356(a)(2), (d).
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sister corporations, section 337 allows the selling corporation to
26 salavoid recognition of gain on the sale of its assets. A recent Tax
Court decision, however, has cast doubt on the applicability of sec-
tion 337 to a liquidation-reincorporation."
The allowance of these favorable results clearly contravenes
congressional intent to tax distributions made by ongoing corpora-
tions as ordinary income.29 Nevertheless, a literal interpretation of
the relevant provisions of the Code 0 supports the taxpayers' bene-
26. Taxpayers have been successful in avoiding the section 337 prohibition against rec-
ognition of loss by selling those assets that would produce a loss prior to the adoption of the
plan of liquidation. See City Bank v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 713 (1962), Virginia Ice &
Freezing Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1251 (1958).
27. The nonrecognition of gain or loss depends on complying with the provisions of
section 337. A plan of complete liquidation must be adopted, and all assets distributed in
complete liquidation within 12 months of the date of the adoption of the plan. The corpora-
tion may avoid the entire provision by failing to adhere to the mechanical test. Rev. Rul. 77-
150, 1977-1 C.B. 88.
Nonrecognition of gain is also available to the liquidating corporation under section 336
when the shareholders employ the more direct form of liquidation-reincorporation. Under
both sections 336 and 337 the recapture provisions would apply. In addition, the corporation
may recognize income under the assignment of income doctrine, section 446(b), the tax ben-
efit rule, or some other theory.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 43-61.
29. In discussing changes in subchapter C under the 1954 Code, the Senate Finance
Committee stated:
[The committee has] not hesitated to depart from the [1939] statute where such
departure was necessary in order to remove unwarranted restrictions on neces-
sary or desirable business transactions or to preclude the use of avoidance de-
vices which have proved successful under the existing code. Thus, [the] commit-
tee would liberalize present law with respect to the non-recognition of gain or
loss in cases which involve mere rearrangements of the corporate structure while
at the same time providing less liberal rules in other areas in order to insure that
transactions which are in substance, although not in form, dividend distributions
by corporations to their shareholders are subject to tax at ordinary income
rather than at capital gain rates.
S. REP. No. 1962, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 42, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4621, 4673.
30. As noted earlier, if this liquidation is given effect, the shareholders are entitled to
capital gains and the continuing corporation to a stepped-up basis. See, e.g., Gallagher v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962) (taxpayers prevailed when the court held that a liquida-
tion-reincorporation was not a reorganization because the facts did not "fall within the care-
ful language of the reorganization sections"); cf. Idol v. Commissioner, 319 F.2d 647, 651
(8th Cir. 1963); ("Form does have some weight and significance in tax law and the selection
of one route over another to a desired end is often a critical choice and may serve validly to
govern the tax effect of a transaction.") For a discussion of the issue of form versus sub-
stance in the context of reorganizations, see Jacobs, Reorganizing the Reorganization Provi-
sions, 35 TAx L. REV. 415 (1980).
The suggestion that form should govern, even over substance, may surprise
tax lawyers schooled in the tradition of Gregory v. Helvering. Yet, upon reflec-
tion, it becomes clear that the present law of corporate reorganizations fre-
quently, although not invariably, turns on formalistic, rather than economically
1984]
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ficial use of the liquidation-reincorporation device for avoiding or-
dinary income treatment of corporate distributions. The Commis-
sioner, therefore, has waged an uphill battle in attempting to
convince the courts that taxpayers who have compiled with the rel-
evant provisions should not receive capital gains treatment. The
Commissioner's attempts to cope with this problem are the subject
of this article.
II. THE COMMISSIONER'S WEAPONS AGAINST THE LIQUIDATION-
REINCORPORATION DEVICE
The statutes involving tax treatment of distributions made by
ongoing corporations to their shareholders require, as a general
rule, that shareholders report such distributions as dividend in-
come. A literal application of the statutes thwarts this congres-
sional intent when the courts recognize the form of the transac-
tions constituting a liquidation-reincorporation. Legislative history
demonstrates Congress's concern with this problem. The House of
Representatives once passed a specific provision dealing with the
tax effects of a liquidation-reincorporation only to have it die in
conference." The legislative history of this provision is less than
substantive, distinctions. Properly planned, almost any acquisitive transaction
can be fitted into or out of the present reorganization sections, without regard to
any similarity of substance.
Id. at 416 (footnote omitted).
31. The House described proposed section 357 in its detailed discussion:
[I]n any case in which one or more individuals receive assets in a complete or
partial liquidation ... from a corporation controlled by such individual or indi-
viduals, and within 5 years from the final distribution in such liquidation, such
individual or individuals transferred more than 50 percent of the assets (other
than money and stock or securities except stock or securities of the distributing
corporation) to one or more corporations controlled by one or more of such indi-
viduals in a transaction in which, under section 351, no gain or loss is recognized,
the consequences set forth [below] shall occur.
H. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A130, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4025, 4268. The detailed provisions of the section provided for no recognition of gain or loss
on assets transferred to the acquiring corporation (although some adjustments would have
been allowed for the period between liquidation and reincorporation). Assets (usually liquid)
retained by the stockholders and not transferred to the new corporation would be taxable as
a dividend to the extent of earnings and profits of the liquidated corporation with any ex-
cess applied against the carryover basis of the new stock. Control was defined as "at least 50
percent of the total combined voting power of the outstanding stock ...or at least 50
percent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock. ... Id at A131, reprinted in
1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 4269. The transferee corporation would be denied a
stepped-up basis for the acquired assets (usually consisting mainly of operating assets). Fur-
ther, attribution of ownership rules would be applicable. The House explicitly intended "to
prevent taxpayers from utilizing the provisions permitting nonrecognition . . . for the pur-
pose of conversion of ordinary income into capital gains where the circumstances of the
LIQUIDATION-REINCORPORATION
illuminating, but the conference report does contain the following
statement:
Liquidation followed by reincorporation.-
The House bill in section 357 contained a provision dealing with
a device whereby it has been attempted to withdraw corporate
earnings at capital gains rates by distributing all the assets of a
corporation in complete liquidation and promptly reincorporat-
ing the business assets. This provision gave rise to certain tech-
nical problems and it has not been retained in the bill as recom-
mended by the accompanying conference report. It is the belief
of the managers on the part of the House that, at the present
time, the possibility of tax avoidance in this area is not suffi-
ciently serious to require a special statutory provision. It is be-
lieved that this possibility can appropriately be disposed of by
judicial decision or by regulation within the framework of the
other provisions of the bill.2
A. The Step Transaction Doctrine
For the most part, the Commissioner has used the judicially
created "step transaction" doctrine as his most potent weapon
against liquidation-reincorporation. This doctrine though not al-
ways described in the same terms,3  generally disregards various
transaction do not warrant such treatment." Id. at A129-30, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4267.
32. H. CONF. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CoDE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3280, 5301 (emphasis added).
33. No matter how phrased, each formulation originates in the language of Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), which required that a transaction have a business purpose as
a prerequisite to being given effect for tax purposes. The doctrine has been articulated in
several ways. For example, "sham" transactions and transactions lacking economic reality
will be disregarded, with the tax consequences depending on the substance of what has oc-
curred. The business purpose test is also applied to judge the transaction by its end result,
disregarding the separate existence of several steps. A more complete discussion is contained
in SURREY & WARREN, supra note 1, at 672-78. Judge Learned Hand, in further explaining
Gregory v. Helvering, said:
It is important to observe just what the Supreme Court held in that case. It was
solicitous to reaffirm the doctrine that a man's motive to avoid taxation will not
establish his liability if the transaction does not do so without it .... The ques-
tion always is whether the transaction under scrutiny is in fact what it appears
to be in form; a marriage may be a joke; a contract may be intended only to
deceive others; an agreement may have a collateral defeasance. In such cases the
transaction as a whole is different from its appearance. True, it is always the
intent that controls; and we need not for this occasion press the difference be-
tween intent and purpose. We may assume that purpose may be the touchstone,
but the purpose which counts is one which defeats or contradicts the apparent
transaction, not the purpose to escape taxation which the apparent, not the
whole, transaction would realize. In Gregory v. Helvering, the incorporators
1984]
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steps or transactions that have no economic substance and that
merely serve to minimize or avoid tax. When the step transaction
doctrine is applied to the typical liquidation-reincorporation, an
examination of the situation before and after the steps usually
reveals the existence of a type D statutory reorganization." Apply-
adopted the usual form for creating business corporations; but their intent, or
purpose, was merely to draught the papers, in fact not to create corporations as
the court understood that word. That was the purpose which defeated their ex-
emption, not the accompanying purpose to escape taxation; that purpose was
legally neutral. Had they really meant to conduct a business by means of the two
reorganized companies, they would have escaped whatever other aim they might
have had, whether to avoid taxes, or to regenerate the world.
Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1935) (citation omitted).
The step transaction doctrine applies when "the separate steps [are] integrated parts of
a single scheme." Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 184 (1942).
If an integrated scheme is found, "[t]ransitory phases of [the] arrangement frequently are
disregarded . . . where they add nothing of substance to the completed affair." Id. at 184-
85; cf. United States v. General Geophysical Co., 296 F.2d 86, 87-88 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 849 (1962).
The solution of hard tax cases requires something more than the easy gener-
alization that the substance rather than the form of a transaction is determina-
tive of its tax effect, since in numerous situations the form by which a transac-
tion is effected does influence or control its tax consequences. This
generalization does, however, reflect the truth that courts will, on occasion, look
beyond the superficial formalities of a transaction to determine the proper tax
treatment.
' * ' Each case must be decided on its own merits by examining the form
and substance of the transactions and the purposes of the relevant tax provi-
sions to determine whether recognition of the form of the transaction would de-
feat the statutory purpose.
296 F.2d at 87-88.
The courts have used two basic tests in assessing a series of transactions. The interde-
pendence test inquires "whether on a reasonable interpretation of objective facts the steps
were so interdependent that the legal relations created by one transaction would have been
fruitless without a completion of the series." King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418
F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (citation omitted). Second, under the end result test, "purport-
edly separate transactions will be amalgamated when it appears that they were really com-
ponent parts of a single transaction intended from the outset to be taken for the purpose of
reaching the ultimate result." Id. (footnote omitted).
34. A "D" reorganization is defined at section 368(a)(1)(D) as:
a transfer by a corporation of all or part of its assets to another corporation if
immediately after the transfer the transferor, or one or more of its shareholders
(including persons who were shareholders immediately before the transfer), or
any combination thereof, is in control of the corporation to which the assets are
transferred; but only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities of the cor-
poration to which the assets are transferred are distributed in a transaction
which qualifies under section 354, 355, or 356 . . ..
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D). Control is statutorily defined as "the ownership of stock possessing at
least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the
corporation." I.R.C. § 368(c).
Courts also applied the step-transaction/D-reorganization analysis under the 1939 Code.
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ing the step transaction doctrine to liquidation-reincorporation,
courts generally view the shareholder's exchange of stock for assets
and the subsequent transfer of some of the assets to the "surviving
corporation" as one transaction-a transfer of assets from one cor-
poration to the other.
The tax consequences to the shareholders and corporate tax-
payers involved in a reorganization differ dramatically from those
situations where the liquidation and reincorporation are recognized
and given effect. Generally, in reorganizations, the Code (1) re-
quires shareholders to report any liquid assets retained as ordinary
dividend income instead of capital gains; 5 (2) denies a stepped-up
basis to the surviving corporate taxpayer, which, under the opera-
tive rules of reorganizations, takes a carryover basis from the
transferor (liquidating) corporation;36 (3) does not erase the earn-
ings and profits account of the transferor;3 7 (4) defines any pre-
ferred stock issued by the transferee (surviving) corporation as sec-
tion 306 stock. Finally, any new debt instruments issued will
See, e.g., Liddon v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956);
Bard-Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 906
(1955); Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949); Survant v. Commissioner, 162
F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947); Heller v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 371 (1943), aff'd, 147 F.2d 376 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945). Although the 1954 Code made the requirements for
a "D" reorganization more stringent, see infra notes 62-80 and accompanying text, the Com-
missioner's argument that a "D" reorganization exists in the context of liquidation-
reincorporation is usually successful, at least where the control requirement is met. See, e.g.,
Rose v. United States, 640 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1981); Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 614
F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Schaffan v. Commissioner, 449 U.S. 836 (1980);
Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018
(1967); Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022
(1967); Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016
(1967); Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1961);
Smothers v. United States, 1979-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9216 (S.D. Tex.), a/I'd, 642 F.2d
894 (5th Cir. 1981); American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204 (1972); DeGroff v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 59 (1970), af'd per curiam, 444 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 1971); Wilson v.
Commissioner, 46 T.C. 334 (1966); James Armour, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 295 (1965).
35. I.R.C. § 356(a). If section 354 would otherwise apply, but money or property is re-
ceived in addition to property entitled to nonrecognition treatment, "then the gain, if any,
to the recipient shall be recognized but in an amount not in excess of [the additional money
or property]." Section 356(a) further provides that if that distribution "has the effect of a
dividend," it is taxable as such to the extent of earnings and profits, with the excess treated
as capital gain. For further discussion, see infra notes 123-36 and accompanying text.
36. I.R.C. § 362(b).
37. I.R.C. § 381. The amount of any distributions treated as dividends to the sharehold-
ers, however, will reduce the earnings and profits. I.R.C. § 312(a).
38. One definition of section 306 stock is stock that is not common and
(i) which was received, by the shareholder selling or otherwise disposing of such
stock, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization (within the meaning of section
368(a)), or in a distribution or exchange to which section 355 (or so much of
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usually generate dividends to the extent of their fair market
value.39
The Commissioner on occasion has argued, with varying de-
grees of success, that a liquidation-reincorporation constitutes a
type E40  or type F41  reorganization. Since any liquidation-
section 356 as relates to section 355) applied, or
(ii) with respect to the receipt of which gain or loss to the shareholder was to
any extent not recognized by reason of part III, but only to the extent that ei-
ther the effect of the transaction was substantially the same as the receipt of a
stock dividend, or the stock was received in exchange for section 306 stock.
I.R.C. § 306(c)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (1976). For a detailed discussion of this provision, see Trimble,
The Treatment of Preferred Stock Distributions in Reorganizations Under Section 306 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 19 TAx L. REV. 345 (1964).
39. Sections 356(a) and (d) provide for the treatment of debt securities received as boot
in certain instances. If debt securities are exchanged, and the principal amount of the secur-
ities receive exceeds the principal amount of securities surrendered, the fair market value of
the excess will be treated as other property under section 356(a). If no securities are surren-
dered, the entire principal amount of the securities received is deemed excess; therefore, the
fair market value of these securities constitutes other property. This refinement was
designed to prevent securities bailouts in much the same manner that section 306, supra
note 38, was designed to prevent preferred stock bailouts. See SURREY & WARREN, supra
note 1, at 860:
The 1954 Revenue Code embodies the view that the exchange of outstanding
stock for debt must meet the tests of the dividend [and redemption] sections. It
is thus an extension of the policy of section 306 respecting preferred stock
bailouts, in that it seeks to block the efforts to convert situations having poten-
tial dividend taxation into situations involving capital gain potential only.
40. Section 368(a)(1)(E) defines as one kind of reorganization a "recapitalization,"
which has been interpreted to mean a reshuffling of the capital structure within an existing
corporation. Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942); see Treas. Reg. §
1.368-2(e)(1)-(5). In Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 C.B. 62, a corporation adopted a plan of com-
plete liquidation, as required by section 337, and sold substantially all of its assets to a
newly formed corporation in exchange for cash, 45% of the new corporation's stock, and
long-term notes. The new corporation sold the remaining 55% of its stock through a public
offering. The old corporation then liquidated, distributing its remaining assets and the pro-
ceeds of the "sale" to its shareholders. The Service implicitly used the step transaction doc-
trine to find "a plan of reorganization which readjusted interest in property continuing in a
modified corporate form." Id. at 63-64. In this manner, the ruling asserts, "[tihe newly
formed 'purchasing' corporation was utilized to effect, in substance, a recapitalization." Id.
at 64. The stock issuance to new investors was disregarded in the Service's first formulation
of the "functionally unrelated" doctrine. See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text; cf.
Reef v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967)
(treating redemption of 48% of liquidating corporation's shareholders as functionally unre-
lated to a reorganization). Other significant aspects of Rev. Rul. 61-156 are discussed infra
notes 143-58 and accompanying text. The attempt to use "E" reorganizations to combat the
liquidation-reincorporation device has met with universal indifference. See Gallagher v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962) (rejecting contention that transaction constituted "E"
reorganization); Hewitt, Liquidations v. Reincorporations and Reorganizations: The Cur-
rent Battle, 15 TUL. TAx. INST. 187, 241-45 (1965).
41. Section 368(a)(1)(F) defines as one type of reorganization "a mere change in iden-
tity, form, or plan of organization, however effected." The Commissioner first attempted to
use the "F" reorganization in the liquidation-reincorporation context in Rev. Rul. 61-156,
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reincorporation that would constitute an "F" reorganization would
also constitute a "D" reorganization, any independent argument
based on the existence of an "F" reorganization would appear to be
of limited use.42
1961-2 C.B. 62. See supra note 40. Subsequent court tests have met with mixed results.
Some have rejected the argument. See, e.g., Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 354 F.2d 35
(4th Cir. 1965) (no "F" reorganization where corporate enterprise is interrupted); Estate of
Lammerts v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 420 (1970) ("F" reorganization inapplicable where there
is a substantial change in ownership or proportionate interest); Berghash v. Commissioner,
43 T.C. 743 (1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966) (if there is a change in stock ownership
or a shift in proprietary interest, transaction does not qualify as an "F" reorganization);
Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962) (shift in proprietary interest inconsistent
with "mere change in identity, form, or place of organization"). Where there has been com-
plete identity of ownership and continuity of business enterprise, some courts have accepted
the "F" reorganization theory. See, e.g., Home Constr. Corp. v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165
(5th Cir. 1971); Associated Mach. v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968); Estate of
Stauffer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968); Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d
874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967). But see Reef Corp. v. Commissioner,
368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967) (redemption of 48% of
transferor's shareholders treated as functionally unrelated; "F" reorganization found despite
lack of complete identity of ownership). See generally Pugh, The F Reorganization: Reveille
for a Sleeping Giant?, 24 TAX L. REV. 437 (1969).
42. In another context a liberal interpretation of section 368(a)(1)(F) will produce un-
wanted results for the Service. Section 381(b)(3) permits an acquiring corporation to car-
ryback a net operating loss to a pre-reorganization taxable year of the transferor only in the
case of an "F" reorganization. I.R.C. § 381(b)(3). The "F" reorganization argument has been
used successfully by a number of taxpayers to take advantage of a loss carryback. See, e.g.,
Home Constr. Corp. v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1971); Associated Mach. v.
Commissioner, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968); Estate of Stauffer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d
611 (9th Cir. 1968). In Rev. Rul. 69-185, 1969-1 C.B. 108, the Service announced its nonac-
quiescence to Stauffer and Associated Machine and refused to recognize a combination of
two or more operating corporations as an "F" reorganization. The rulings also rejected that
portion of Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), that found an "F" reorgan-
ization. Realizing the double-edged nature of "F" reorganizations, the Commissioner did not
argue for the presence of an "F" reorganization on appeal in Davant. Nevertheless, the ap-
pellate court decided sua sponte that the transaction constituted an "F" reorganization. See
Pugh, supra note 41, at 459. The courts have noticed the Commissioner's dilemma. "[Tihe
Commissioner does not take issue with the 'F' reorganization finding in the Davant factual
context. In effect, he says that an 'F' reorganization is one thing when the issue is treatment
of gain and another when the issue is loss carryback." Estate of Stauffer v. Commissioner,
403 F.2d 611, 619 (9th Cir. 1968). For a detailed discussion of the Davant case, see infra
text accompanying notes 158-87.
Congress amended section 368(a)(1)(F) in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324. An "F" reorganization is now limited to
"a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization of one corporation." I.R.C. §
368(a)(1)(F) (emphasis added). Therefore, any fusion of two operating companies after Jan-
uary 1, 1983 cannot be an "F" reorganization. Prior to the TEFRA amendment of section
368(a)(1)(F), some courts had required identity of ownership and continuity of business en-
terprise. See Romy Hammes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 900 (1977) (no "F" reorganiza-
tion where business activities were different and proprietary interest changed); Berger
Mach. Prod., Inc. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 358 (1977) (shift in proprietary interest pre-
cluded "F" reorganization). In an interesting twist, however, one court combined the func-
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B. No Liquidation Has Occurred
In his attempts to deny the tax benefits of a liquidation-
reincorporation, the Commissioner has argued that no liquidation
has occurred when the business of the liquidated corporation con-
tinues with the use of the same operating assets. To date, this ar-
gument has never prevailed where the facts would not permit the
finding of a statutory reorganization.4 A court has found "no liqui-
dation" in the context of a liquidation-reincorporation fact situa-
tion, but only to deny non-reorganization of gain under section
33744 on the sale of assets by the liquidating corporation to its sis-
ter corporation.
In Telephone Answering Service Co. v. Commissioner" the
taxpayer (TASCO) operated telephone answering services, as it did
two wholly owned subsidiaries, Houston and North American.
TASCO also generated income by providing managerial services to
North American and Houston. 4 A third party desiring to purchase
Houston approached TASCO. Willing to sell, but unwilling to be
taxed on the gain on the sale of the Houston stock, TASCO
(1) adopted a "plan of complete liquidation";
(2) sold the Houston stock for cash;
(3) transferred its directly owned operating assets to a
newly created subsidiary (New TASCO) in exchange for that
corporation's stock; and
(4) dissolved, distributing to its shareholders pro rata the
cash proceeds from the sale of the Houston stock and the stock
in North American and New TASCO. 7
The taxpayer contended that it was completely liquidated and en-
titled, under section 337, to nonrecognition of gain on the sale of
the Houston stock. The Commissioner responded by contending
tionally unrelated test, infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text, and section 368(a)(1)(F).
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 568 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976), a parent
created a new subsidiary to acquire an existing subsidiary's business. Minority shareholders
owned 48% of the original subsidiary's stock, which the parent redeemed in exchange for
the parent's stock. The court characterized the redemption as separate transaction and
found an "F" reorganization. The Commissioner had previously prevailed under similar cir-
cumstances in Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1018 (1967) (redemption of 48% of transferor's shareholders treated as functionally
unrelated; "F" reorganization found).
43. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962), discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 99-122.
44. I.R.C. § 337; see infra text accompanying notes 45-61.
45. 63 T.C. 423 (1974).
46. Id. at 424-25.
47. Id. at 432.
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that the transaction constituted a reorganization.
The Tax Court first sidestepped the question of whether these
transactions constituted a "D" reorganization, concluding that the
resolution of that question was unnecessary to determine whether
section 337 applied to the sale of the Houston stock:
Although the notice of deficiency merely denied the applicability
of § 337, respondent in this Court concentrates principally on
the argument that the instant transaction was a reorganization
meeting the requirements of §§ 354 and 368(a)(1)(D). We find it
unnecessary to reach this issue, particularly with regard to the
question whether New TASCO acquired "substantially all" of
TASCO's assets, and we express no opinion as to its proper reso-
lution. Similarly, we do not consider the proposition, disavowed
by respondent, that the exchange should be treated in whole or
in part as a divisive reorganization qualifying under § 355. In
this context, we emphasize that we are dealing herein with the
question of nonrecognition of gain at the corporate level and
not with the tax consequences of the transactions at the share-
holder level; in view of the complexities involved in determining
those consequences, under a variety of permutations and combi-
nations, it is conceivable that they might be subjected to a dif-
ferent analysis.' 8
A "complete liquidation" is a prerequisite for nonrecognition
of gain under section 337, and the Tax Court determined that no
such liquidation had occurred. This conclusion was "founded on
both the history and purpose[s] of the statute.' e Aware that this
decision was inconsistent with its position when the taxability of
the distributions to shareholders was involved,50 the court at-
tempted to distinguish the meaning of "liquidation" in sections
337 and 331. It referred to certain provisions of section 337 that
incorporate the term "complete liquidation," 1 but, perhaps incon-
sistently, also stated that the reality and substance of the liquida-
tion, rather than formal acts, were controlling.2 The court quoted
Davant v. Commissioner:58 "'Those provisions [dealing with com-
48. 63 T.C. at 432 n.4 (emphasis in original).
49. Id. at 433.
50. In Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144, (1962), the Tax Court held that a find-
ing of no liquidation could only be made where a reorganization existed.
51. Section 337 requires that the adoption of a "plan of complete liquidation" must
precede the sale and distribution and that the corporation must distribute all of the assets
in "complete liquidation."
52. 63 T.C. at 434 (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) and Lewis v. Com-
missioner, 176 F.2d 646, 649-50 (1st Cir. 1949)).
53. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967); see infra text ac-
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plete liquidation] contemplate that operating assets will no longer
be used by the stockholders to carry on the business as a corpora-
tion.' ",54 TASCO's actions did not constitute a bona fide elimina-
tion of the corporate entity because the business continued unin-
terrupted with substantially the same owners.
The majority stated that the decision would have been differ-
ent if the shareholder continuity requirement had not been met.55
Anomalous results will occur if this analysis is followed. If a reor-
ganization is found, the transferor corporation will not recognize
gain, but the shareholders will receive dividends and the transferee
corporation will have a carryover basis. If a reorganization is not
found because of the insufficient continuity of shareholder owner-
ship (the control requirement), the transferor corporation will not
recognize gain under section 337, the shareholders will receive cap-
ital gains treatment,' and the transferee corporation will receive
the assets at a stepped-up basis."' Arguably, however, under
TASCO, when the control requirement is met, but no reorganiza-
tion can be found because one of the other definitional require-
ments is not met,58 section 337 will not apply; the transferor corpo-
ration will have to recognize gain or loss on a sale of its assets to a
third party, but presumably the shareholders will have capital
gains and the transferee corporation a stepped-up basis.
The inconsistency between the result reached by the TASCO
majority and earlier decisions involving treatment of shareholders
was not lost on the dissenting judges. Noting that shareholders
could employ the rationale of this opinion in a liquidation-
reincorporation when the issue was dividend versus capital gains,59
.companying notes 161-92.
54. 63 T.C. at 434 (quoting Davant, 366 F.2d at 882) (alteration in TASCO opinion). It
is ironic that Davant was cited, since the Tax Court rejected the "functionally unrelated"
analysis in American Mfg., Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204 (1970). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 191-243. Furthermore, Davant interpreted section 331, not section 337, while
the court in TASCO attempted to distinguish those sections.
55. 63 T.C. at 436 ("where such divergence in shareholder interest does not exist and
the transferee corporation continues the business of the transferor, the courts have consist-
ently held no complete liquidation occurs").
56. I.R.C. § 331.
57. This would result under sections 334, 351, and 362, where the liquidation precedes
the reorganization, or under section 1012 where brother-sister corporations are used. See
infra note 252.
58. For example, in TASCO, there is doubt as to whether substantially all of the assets
where transferred to New TASCO. See Note, New Answers to the Liquidation-
Reincorporation Problem, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 268, 279-80 (1976).
59. The majority, however, did disavow an intent to deal with liquidation-reincorpora-
tion "at the shareholder level." See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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the dissent interpreted the majority opinion as requiring that a
section 337 liquidation be more "complete" than a section 331 liq-
uidation,60 and stated: "This novel suggestion finds no support in
any decisional law and in fact flies in the face of the discussion of
these sections in Commissioner v. Berghash and Breech v. United
States."61 The dissent correctly concluded that this opinion will
create uncertainty where none existed previously. Although the
TASCO court's approach is novel and could create uncertainty,
there should be relatively few situations where the case would ap-
ply because it is rare for a reorganization not to be found in the
liquidation-reincorporation context unless it is the control require-
ment that has not been met.
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STEP TRANSACTION DOCTRINE AGAINST
THE LIQUIDATION-REINCORPORATION DEVICE
The dramatic difference in tax consequences when a pur-
ported liquidation is given effect has provoked the Service to deny
liquidation treatment to a liquidation-reincorporation device. Its
most effective weapon under both the 1939 and 1954 Codes has
been to recharacterize the transactions as a "D" reorganization by
using the step transaction doctrine.2 Under the 1939 Code a "D"
reorganization was defined as:
a transfer by a corporation of all or part of its assets to another
corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its
shareholders or both are in control of the corporation to which
the assets are transferred.'
Under the 1954 Code, Congress added several provisions in-
tended to prevent the bailout of corporate earnings and profits at
capital gains rates.6 4 One situation with such potential was a corpo-
rate division accompanied by a spin-off to the shareholders of the
stock in one or more corporations. 5 Earlier, between 1934 and
60. 63 T.C. at 438.
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
63. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(g)(1)(C), 53 Stat. 1, 40 (current version at I.R.C. §
368(a)(1)(D)).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
65. The stock of the spun-off corporation, which often held liquid assets, could then be
sold by the shareholders and any gain taxed at capital gains rates. It was just such a device
that gave rise to the landmark decision in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), and
resulted in development of the business purpose doctrine, see supra note 9, as well as im-
portant revisions of the Internal Revenue Code, see infra notes 67-75 and accompanying
text.
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1951, Congress enacted several provisions designed to deny reor-
ganization status to corporate spin-offs.66 In 1951, Congress recog-
nized that there are occasions when spin-offs serve a legitimate
corporate purpose6 7 and again amended the Code to permit spin-
offs that complied with carefully drafted limitations to eliminate
the possibility of bailouts.68 Section 355,69 added in 1954 as the
successor to section 112 of the 1939 Code, continues to subject cor-
porate division to strict tests designed to prevent bailouts70 as a
66. The lower court's decision in Gregory v. Helvering, 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), rev'd, 69
F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd 293 U.S. 645 (1935) (a spin-off was used to extract corporate
earnings and profits at capital gains rates) motivated Congress. At that time, the Code
provided:
If there is distributed, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, to a shareholder
in a corporation a party to the reorganization, stock or securities in such corpo-
ration or in another corporation a party to the reorganization, without the sur-
render by such shareholder of stock or securities in such a corporation, no gain
to the distributee from the receipt of such stock or securities shall be recognized.
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(c), 43 Stat. 253, 256-57 (emphasis added). The lower
court in Gregory found that, since the transaction literally complied with the Code, the
receipt of the spun-off stock was tax-free. 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932). Although the court's deci-
sion was eventually reversed, Congress did not reenact the statutory provision as part of the
1934 Code. For a history of the changes in the treatment of spin-offs, see B. BivTKER & J.
EUSTICE, supra note 3, V 13.02; Mette, Spin-Off Reorganization and the Revenue Act of
1951, 8 TAx. L. REv. 337 (1953).
The bailout potential of spin-offs generated not only legislative but also judicial re-
sponse; Gregory resulted in formulation of the business purpose doctrine. See supra note 9.
The doctrine, in turn, was incorporated into later Code provisions governing divisive reorga-
nizations. See infra notes 68, 70.
67. Efforts were made to persuade Congress to reinstate a spin-off provision. "Passage
was finally achieved in the Revenue Act of 1951, because it was felt that it was 'economically
unsound to impede spin-offs which break up business into a greater number of enterprises,
when undertaken for legitimate business purpose.'" Mette, supra note 66, at 340 (quoting
S. REP. No. 871, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 58, reprinted in 1951 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1969, 1029).
68. This was accomplished by codifying the judicial doctrines of business purpose and
continuity-of-interest:
If there is distributed, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, to a shareholder
of a corporation which is a party to the reorganization, stock (other than pre-
ferred stock) in another corporation which is a party to the reorganization, with-
out the surrender by such shareholder of stock, no gain to the distributee from
the receipt of such stock shall be recognized unless it appears that (A) any cor-
poration which is a party to such reorganization was not intended to continue
the active conduct of a trade or business after such reorganization, or (B) the
corporation whose stock is distributed was used principally as a device for the
distribution of earnings and profits to the shareholders of any corporation a
party to the reorganization.
Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 183, § 317, 65 Stat. 452, 493 (amending Int. Rev. Code of
1939, § 112(b), 53 Stat. 1, 37-39). The 1954 Code retained the same restrictions. See infra
note 70.
69. I.R.C. § 355.
70. Section 355 continued and expanded upon the antibailout provisions of the 1939
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condition precedent to a tax-free distribution. At the same time,
Congress changed the definition of a "D" reorganization to require
that the transferor corporation distribute all of the stock and se-
curities of the transferee corporation in a transaction that qualifies
under section 354, 355, or 356. Thus, a "D" reorganization is now
defined as:
a transfer by a corporation of all or part of its assets to another
corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor, or
one or more of its shareholders (including persons who were
shareholders immediately before the transfer), or any combina-
tion thereof, is in control of the corporation to which the assets
are transferred; but only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or
securities of the corporation to which the assets are transferred
are distributed in a transaction which qualifies under section
354, 355, or 356.1
At the same time Congress amended section 35472 to preclude
nonrecognition unless "the corporation to which the assets are
transferred acquires substantially all of the assets of the transferor
of such assets."7 In addition, the stock, securities, and other
properties received by such transferor, as well as the other proper-
ties of such transferor, must be distributed in pursuance of the
plan of reorganization. 4 The net effect of sections 355 and 354(b)
is that the tax-free nature of a divisive reorganization must be
tested under section 355. The only transaction that could qualify
for tax-free treatment as a "D" reorganization under section 354 is
a transfer of "substantially all" of a corporation's assets to a sub-
sidiary followed by a liquidation of the transferor.7 5
Code. Section 355(a)(1)(A) requires the corporation to distribute to shareholders and secur-
ity holders "solely stock or securities of a corporation ...which it controls immediately
before the distribution." The corporation is further required to distribute "all of the stock
and securities held by it immediately before the distribution" or an amount "constituting
control within the meaning of section 368(c) . . ." I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(D). In the latter case,
the taxpayer must establish "to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the retention by the
distributing corporation of stock. was not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its
principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax." Id. In addition, under section
355(a)(1)(B), the transaction must not have been "used principally as a device for the distri-
bution of the earnings and the profits of the distributing corporation or the controlled cor-
poration or both," and must satisfy the detailed active business requirements of section
355(b)(1)(C).
71. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D).
72. I.R.C. § 354(b).
73. I.R.C. § 354(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
74. I.R.C. § 354(b)(1)(B).
75. The changes were made "to insure that the tax consequences of the distribution of
stocks or securities to shareholders or security holders in connection with divisive reorgani-
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Although the use of corporate divisions to bail out earnings
and profits was curtailed, the definitional changes apparently made
it more difficult to fit the liquidation-reincorporation bailout
within the definition of a "D" reorganization.7 6 Under the 1954
Code, the following elements are prerequisites to the finding of a
"D" reorganization: (1) there must be a plan of reorganization7
pursuant to which (2) substantially all of the assets of the trans-
feror are distributed7 8 (3) to another corporation controlled by the
transferor and/or one or more of its shareholder(s),79 and (4) stock
or securities of the transferee must be distributed.8 0 Despite this
seemingly more stringent definition, the 1954 changes did not seri-
ously hinder the Service in dealing with liquidation-reincorpora-
tion because the courts continued to liberally construe the require-
ments in that context.
The definitional requirements of a "D" reorganization are con-
sidered below, followed by an analysis of representative cases that
raise significant issues in the use of the "D" reorganization to com-
bat the liquidation-reincorporation device and that illustrate the
shortcomings of this approach.
zations [would] be governed by the requirements of section 355 . S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 274, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4912-13; see
also Smothers v. United States, 642 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1981): "The 'substantially all assets'
requirement of § 354(b)(1)(A) and the amendment of § 368(a)(1)(D) incorporating that re-
quirement were added during the 1954 recodification as part of a package of amendments
aimed at plugging a different loophold [different from liquidation-reincorporation]-the
bail-out of corporate earnings and profits of capital gains rates through divisive reorganiza-
tions." Id. at 899.
Section 354(b) does not require liquidation of the distributing corporation. Subsection
(1)(B), however, requires distribution of "the stock, securities, and other properties received
by [the] transferor, as well as the other properties of such transferor . . . ." I.R.C. §
354(b)(1)(B). The effect is the same as a liquidation. See B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra
note 3, 5 14.16. The distribution requirement has been liberally interpreted when the Ser-
vice seeks to recharacterize a liquidation-reincorporation as a "D" reorganization in order to
prevent a bailout of earnings and profits. See Grubbs v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 42 (1962).
76. At the same time, Congress rejected a Code provisions specifically dealing with liq-
uidation-reincorporation. See supra text accompanying note 32. Most courts have continued
to employ the flexible approach of pre-1954 cases. See infra text accompanying notes 81-95.
77. I.R.C. §§ 354(b)(1)(B), 368(a)(1)(D).
78. I.R.C. § 354(b)(1)(D).
79. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D).
80. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (stock or securities of corporation acquiring assets must be
"distributed in a transaction which qualifies under section 354, 355, or 356"); I.R.C. §
354(b)(1)(B) (section 354 does not apply to a "D" reorganization unless "the stock, securi-
ties, and other properties received by such transferor . . . are distributed in pursuance of
the plan of reorganization").
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A. Requirements of a "D" Reorganization
1. A PLAN OF REORGANIZATION
Sections 354 and 361 grant tax-free treatment to shareholders
and corporations who are parties to a reorganization only if the
transaction is in "pursuance of the plan of reorganization."8 The
cases make clear that the plan need not be written or formal, 2 nor
is the label the taxpayer places on the transaction dispositive.83
The court instead looks to whether, in pursuance of an overall
plan, what occurred was in substance a reorganization. 4 This rea-
soning in effect makes the requirement of a plan of reorganization
meaningless. If the court determines that the transaction consti-
tutes a reorganization, a plan is found; on the other hand, if the
court finds that there has been no reorganization, no plan will be
found, thus making satisfaction of the requirement depend on the
ultimate determination.
81. I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(1), 361(a). Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(g) (1955) elaborates on the
requirement:
The term "plan of reorganization" has reference to a consummated transac-
tion specifically defined as a reorganization under section 368(a). The term is not
to be construed as broadening the definition of "reorganization" as set forth in
section 368(a), but is to be taken as limiting the nonrecognition of gain or loss to
such exchanges or distributions as are directly a part of the transaction specifi-
cally described as a reorganization in section 368(a). Moreover, the transaction,
or series of transactions, embraced in a plan of reorganization, must not only
come within the specific language of section 368(a), but the readjustments in-
volved in the exchanges or distributions effected in the consummation thereof
must be undertaken for reasons germane to the continuance of the business of a
corporation a party to the reorganization. Section 368(a) contemplates genuine
corporate reorganizations which are designed to effect a readjustment of contin-
uing interests under modified corporate forms.
82. See, e.g., Wilson v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 344 (1966); Pebble Springs Distilling Co.
v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 196 (1954), affd, 231 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
836 (1956).
83. Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836
(1980): "The controlling stockholders chose to call to transaction a plan of liquidation. If
what resulted was a plan of reorganization, the chosen label is not dispositive." Id. at 866;
see also Wilson v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 335, 354 (1966): "That the word 'reorganization'
was not used by the stockholders or directors is immaterial. It is sufficient that the various
steps were taken pursuant to the plan agreed upon by [taxpayers] and their advisers."
84. See, e.g., Atlas Tool v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
836 (1980); Wilson v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 334 (1966); Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v.
Commissioner, 23 T.C. 196 (1954), alI'd, 231 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 836
(1956). But see Swanson v. United States, 479 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1973): "The statutory
requirements for any section 368 reorganization are detailed and precise, and must be spe-
cifically met. . . .[A reorganization] plan cannot be manufactured by afterthought." Id. at
545 (citations omitted)(quoting Kind v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 600, 608 (1970)).
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2. SUBSTANTIALLY ALL THE ASSETS
The addition of the requirement in 1954 that the transferee
acquire substantially all of the transferor's assets has not proved
restrictive."5 For example, in James Armour, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner,81 one corporation sold its operating assets to another corpo-
ration that had identical shareholders with identical proprietary
interests. The transferor corporation then liquidated, distributing
all of the liquid assets to the shareholders. Although the operating
assets constituted only fifty-one percent of the total assets, the Tax
Court held that the "substantially all" requirement had been
satisfied:
Thus, it will be seen that as a result of the transactions Excavat-
ing [the newly formed corporation] either acquired title to, or
the use of, all the assets essential to the conduct of the business
enterprise. It seems clear that the assets which it did not ac-
quire, namely, cash and accounts receivable, were not necessary
to the conduct of the enterprise. If such unneeded assets had
been distributed to the petitioners prior to the transfer of the
essential assets to Excavating there clearly would be no question
that substantially all of Armour, Inc.'s assets were acquired by
Excavating .... [T]he date of distribution is not decisive in
such a situation as is here presented. Accordingly, we conclude
that substantially all of the assets of Armour, Inc. were acquired
by Excavating within the contemplation of section 354(b)(1)(A)
of the Code.87
85. See supra note 75. But see discussion of TASCO, supra text accompanying notes
45-61.
86. 43 T.C. 295 (1964). Prior to the transaction in question, Armour, Inc. had assets
with a fair market value of $1,230,000. Operating assets (construction equipment, furniture,
fixtures, and automobiles) with a total value of $628,577.82 were transferred directly to the
new corporation. The remaining assets (an office building, cash, and accounts receivable)
were distributed to the shareholders (the office building was immediately leased to the new
corporation). The court found that substantially all of the assets had been transferred.
87. Id. at 309 (citation omitted). The court relied on liberal construction of the term
"substantially all the assets" in cases decided under earlier codes that dealt with "C" reor-
ganizations. "Even this provision had been subjected to construction which in effect applies
a continuity test rather than mere blind percentages." Southland Ice Co. v. Commissioner, 5
T.C. 842, 850 n.4 (1945) (construing section 112(g)(1)(B) of the 1939 Code). "Whether the
properties transferred constitute 'substantially all' is a matter to be determined from the
facts and circumstances in each case rather than by the application of any particular per-
centage." Smith v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 702, 705 (1936) (construing section 112 of the
1928 Code). "The term 'substantially all' is a relative term, dependent on the facts of any
given situation." Daily Telegram Co. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 101, 105 (1936) (construing
section 203(h) of the 1924 Code). The court in James Armour, Inc. adopted its analysis from
a case considering the meaning of "substantially all" in section 112(i)(1)(A) of the 1928
Code.
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3. THE CONTROL REQUIREMENT
In order for a transaction or series of transactions to consti-
tute a "D" reorganization, the transferor, or one or more of its
shareholders, or any combination thereof, must be in control of the
transferee corporation."8 For purposes of the reorganization provi-
sions, the 1954 Code defines "control" as "the ownership of stock
possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power
of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the
total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corpora-
tion."' s The 1939 Code defined "control" in identical terms.90
The Service has enjoyed success in classifying a transaction as
a "D" reorganization when the continuity of shareholder interest
meets the eighty percent control requirement."' When control has
As stated above, assets which the old company transferred to the new company
constituted 86% of its total worth and included all of the assets essential to the
operation of its business .... The "other assets" retained by the old company,
while substantial in amount, were merely investments held by it. If the old com-
pany had distributed these "other assets" to its stockholders prior to these
transactions rather than afterward, it could not have been denied that the old
company had transferred "substantially all" of its property to the new company.
Instead of doing this, it transferred its distributing business to the new company
first and then distributed its "other assets" to its stockholders as a liquidating
dividend. As the "other assets" were never used to continue the old company in
business, and as its liquidation was merely carrying out a previous agreement, it
does not seem that the date of the distribution of these "other assets" should be
considered as decisive of the issue.
Commissioner v. First Nat'l Bank, 104 F.2d 865, 870 (3d Cir. 1939).
88. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (1976).
89. I.R.C. § 368(c) (1976).
90. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(h), 53 Stat. 1, 40.
91. The requirement is that shareholders of the transferor own 80% of the transferee's
stock. There is no requirement that 80% of the shareholders of the transferor be sharehold-
ers of the transferee. Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 196, 200 (1954),
afl'd, 231 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 836 (1956). The judicially created con-
tinuity-of-interest doctrine, however, would be applicable.
The continuity-of-interest doctrine has a multifaceted character, depending
upon the context in which it arises. At the corporate level, the major focus is on
the business enterprise and its continuation, under modified form, following the
corporate readjustment . . . at the investor level, the relevant factors are the
nature and extent of their continued participation in the corporation's control,
earnings, and assets, and the relationship of their interests to those of other
shareholders and security holders after the transaction has been consummated.
Thus, the nature of the consideration received in the transaction (stock, debt, or
other property), the remoteness of the ownership interests from the underlying
assets of the business, the proportion of all owners who continue their participa-
tion after the transaction, the length of time the investor interests continue
(holding period aspects), and the special features and problems of "debt securi-
ties" all form important aspects of the continuity-of-interest concept.
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been less than eighty percent, however, the courts have rigidly ap-
plied the requirement to deny reorganization treatment under both
the 1939 and the 1954 Codes. 2 For example, the court denied reor-
ganization treatment in a liquidation-reincorporation transaction
when the sole shareholder of the transferor acquired only sixty-
nine percent of the shares of the transferee."3
4. DISTRIBUTION OF THE TRANSFEREE'S STOCK OR SECURITIES
The requirement that the transferee's stock or securities be
distributed is the most liberally construed of the "D" reorganiza-
tion provisions under both the 1939 and the 1954 Codes.9 The
courts have found such a distribution unnecessary where share-
holders held 100% of the stock of both the transferor and the
transferee.9 5
B. BrrrKER & J. EuSTicE, supra note 3, 14.11, at 14-17 to -18. Section 1.368-1(b) of the
Treasury Regulations incorporates the continuity-of-interest requirement. The Service has
stated that:
The "continuity-of-interest requirement". . is satisfied if there is a continuing
interest through stock ownership in the acquiring or transferee corporation...
on the part of former shareholders of the acquired or transferor corporation
which is equal in value, as of the effective date of the reorganization, to at least
50 percent of the value of all of the formerly outstanding stock of the acquired
or transferor corporation as of the same date. It is not necessary that each share-
holder . . . receive in the exchange stock . . . equal in value to at least 50 per-
cent of the value of his former stock interest. . . so long as one or more of the
shareholders. . . have a continuing interest. . . which is, in the aggregate, equal
in value to at least 50 percent of the value of all of the formerly outstanding
stock ....
Rev. Proc. 77-137, 1977-2 C.B. 568, 569.
92. See, e.g., Breech v. United States, 439 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1971); Commissioner v.
Berghash, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966); Turner Advertising, Inc. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M.
(CCH) 532 (May 16, 1966); Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962); Austin Transit,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 849 (1953), acq. 1954-1 C.B. 3; Schumacher Wall Bd. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 1211 (1936), aff'd, 93 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1937); Spang, Chalvant &
Co. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 721 (1934). In Breech, the Service argued without success
for application of the section 318 attribution rules for determining control. In Stanton v.
United States, 512 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1975), however, the court found the requisite control
where 49 percent of the shares of the new corporation were transferred to the former share-
holder's wife. Since the wife had transferred nothing to the corporation in return for the
stock, the court held that the stock was first transferred to the husband, establishing the
requisite control, then transferred by him to his wife as a gift.
93. Austin Transit, Inc. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 849 (1953), acq. 1954-1 C.B. 3.
94. See, e.g., Davant, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966); Wilson v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 334
(1966); James Armour, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 295 (1964); Liddon v. Commissioner,
22 T.C. 1220 (1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956); Heller
v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 371 (1943), afl'd, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868
(1945).
95. If the transferor's assets had been transferred to a newly formed corporation
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B. Limitations in the "D" Reorganization Argument
1. THE CONTROL REQUIREMENT
As indicated, the courts have construed some definitional re-
quirements liberally to find a "D" reorganization in the context of
a liquidation-reincorporation. However, there are often valid busi-
ness reasons for changing more than twenty percent of the owner-
ship of the corporation; and even though the taxpayers could have
achieved their objectives by a simpler method, the courts have con-
sistently refused to recharacterize a liquidation-reincorporation as
a "D" reorganization absent the requisite control. 6
Such change of control in a closely held corporation may occur
for a variety of reasons.9e An active shareholder may die, become
disabled, or simply may wish to retire. The corporation or other
shareholders may acquire those shares pursuant to a right of first
refusal or mandatory buy-out agreement. However, sometimes
there is not such agreement or the right of first refusal is waived
and shares are sold to outsiders. Key employees or others may wish
to make an initial investment in the business. Acquisitions by new
shareholders may occur independently or concurrently with a par-
tial or complete redemption of shares by existing shareholders.
The parties may accomplish their objectives simply by having
the corporation redeem the holdings of the withdrawing share-
holder(s) and by allowing the new investors to purchase shares
from the corporation. Alternatively, the new investors could
purchase some or all of the withdrawing shareholder's interest. In
either case, there are no immediate tax consequences to the contin-
uing shareholders" who sell no shares to the corporation. If such a
in exchange for stock, there is no question that the boot would have been taxa-
ble as dividend income. That an existing corporation in which the taxpayer was
the sole shareholder was used instead of a newly formed one cannot alter the
true nature of the transaction. Here, the issuance of new stock would have been
a meaningless gesture since the stock the taxpayer already held represented the
total value of all the assets except for the boot.
Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676, 680 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1961).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
97. In a closely held corporation, a shareholder's business purpose is often considered a
valid business purpose. See, e.g., Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.
1962) (shareholder's estate planning considerations constituted a valid business purpose for
a divisive reorganization).
98. A continuing shareholder may be deemed to have received a constructive dividend
if the corporation redeems shares which a shareholder was unconditionally obligated to
purchase. See, e.g., Sullivan v. United States, 363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966) (redemption of
minority shareholder's stock resulted in dividend to majority shareholder personally obli-
gated to purchase on termination of minority shareholder's employment).
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shift in ownership is contemplated, however, a liquidation-
reincorporation is an inviting vehicle because it also allows the
continuing shareholders to withdraw liquid assets from the busi-
ness and to escape dividend treatment. Further, the new corpora-
tion holds the operating assets with a stepped-up basis, and the
liquidating corporation's earnings and profits are eliminated.
The Tax Court confronted this issue in Gallagher v. Commis-
sioner.9 West Coast Terminals, Inc., a Delaware corporation (Del-
aware) with its principal place of business in San Francisco, was
engaged in the stevedoring and terminal business. There were two
groups of shareholders: five active executives and directors who
owned sixty-two percent of the outstanding stock; and estates or
persons who acquired their stock through the death of persons for-
merly active in the business held the remaining thirty-eight per-
cent. The latter group was inactive in the conduct of the business,
and several wished to terminate their investment because of the
low yield and speculative nature of the business.100
On June 17, 1955, West Coast Terminals of California (Cali-
fornia) was formed. The shareholders of this corporation, who in-
vested a total of $300,000, also consisted of two groups. Delaware's
active shareholders acquired 72-2/ percent of California, and Cali-
fornia issued the remaining stock to key employees of Delaware
who previously had no equity interest.101
On July 18, 1955, California purchased all of Delaware's oper-
ating assets and prepaid expenses and was assigned Delaware's
trade contracts for $100,264.56.102 Delaware completely terminated
its business, converted its remaining assets (accounts receivable) to
cash, and distributed all of the cash to the shareholders in 1955
and 1956. The distributions were completed by May 3, 1956, at
which time the outstanding shares were surrendered and cancelled.
The State of Delaware had previously issued a Certificate of
Dissolution.0 "
The shareholders treated the proceeds as received from the
sales or exchanges of their stock, reporting capital gain to the ex-
tent the proceeds exceeded the basis of the stock surrendered. The
Commissioner contended that the distributions constituted divi-
99. 39 T.C. 144 (1962).
100. Id. at 145-47.
101. Id. at 149-50.
102. This represented the book value of the property, as well as its fair market value.
Id. at 150.
103. Id. at 151.
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dends to the continuing shareholders to the extent of their ratable
share of Delaware's earnings and profits.10'
Several valid business purposes for these transactions existed:
termination of the inactive shareholders' equity interest; acquisi-
tion by key employees of an initial proprietary interest in the busi-
ness; and a shift in the relative percentage of ownership among the
continuing shareholders. 105 As previously explained, the sharehold-
ers could have accomplished these purposes in a simpler manner
than liquidation-reincorporation. Delaware could have redeemed
the shares of the inactive shareholders and sold shares to those
who wished to acquire a new or additional equity interest. How-
ever, that method would not have allowed the continuing share-
holders to extract liquid assets without dividend consequences, and
the operating assets would not have had a stepped-up basis. The
controlling shareholders admittedly employed a liquidation-
reincorporation on the advice of counsel to achieve favorable tax
results, as well as the desired business purposes.'
The Commissioner advanced two alternative arguments in
support of his position that the continuing shareholders 0 7 had re-
ceived dividend income. First, he contended "that a complete liq-
uidation did not in substance occur."' 0 Alternatively, he asserted
that these transactions were interrelated and constituted a statu-
tory reorganization under the step-transaction doctrine. Therefore,
the proceeds of the redemption constituted boot and, at least to
some extent,10 9 a dividend under section 356(a)(2).
The Service argued that, even though the distributions made
by Delaware fit the literal definition of one of a series of distribu-
tions in complete liquidation," 0 the transaction should not be
104. Id. at 151-54.
105. Id. at 153-54.
106. Id. at 154.
107. The other shareholders were not parties to the suit. Presumably, they were enti-
tled to sale or exchange treatment under section 302(b)(3) (redemption treated as full pay-
ment in exchange for stock if shareholder's interest in corporation is completely
terminated).
108. 39 T.C. at 155. The court noted that the Commissioner did not refer to section
302, but assumed that he was arguing that this was a redemption essentially equivalent to a
dividend.
109. Presumably, to the extent of each continuing shareholder's gain and limited to his
ratable share of earnings and profits in Delaware. I.R.C. § 356(c)(2).
110. Because there was more than one distribution, the controlling provision was sec-
tion 346(a)(1) (one of a series of distributions in redemption of all of the stock of the corpo-
ration pursuant to a plan). Section 331 treats amounts distributed in complete or partial
liquidations as payment in exchange for the stock. However, whatever rationale supported a
finding that a liquidation had or had not occurred would not depend on whether it was
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treated as a liquidation because it was primarily a vehicle for dis-
tributing earnings and profits."' The Tax Court rejected the argu-
ment that a complete liquidation had not occurred. 112 It observed
that liquidations are usually accompanied by a distribution that
includes accumulated earnings of the liquidating corporation, but
that Congress had dictated that such transactions are to be treated
as a sale or exchange and not as a distribution governed by section
301. The statutory language compelled the same conclusion:
The conclusion that the redemption of Delaware's stock in
the course of its liquidation is not to be considered as an ordi-
nary dividend is fortified by an examination of the provisions of
section 346. From the language of section 346(a), it would ap-
pear that a distribution in redemption of all of the stock of the
corporation pursuant to a plan can never be essentially
equivalent to a dividend as referred to in section 302(b)(1). This
is because Congress found it necessary to include that condition
in section 346(a)(2), which refers to the redemption of a part of
the stock of the corporation, but omitted it in section 346(a)(1).
We cannot assume that this was without significance.
Furthermore, "[s]ection 302 does not apply to that portion
of any distribution which qualifies as a distribution in partial
liquidation under section 346.'
In addition, the court lacked a precedent for treating distribution
made in a liquidation-reincorporation as a dividend, except when
application of the reorganization provisions could accomplish that
result.114
With respect to the Commissioner's second argument, the
court recognized that if a reorganization in fact had occurred, the
distributions would receive dividend treatment under section 356.
This series of steps, however, did not amount to a statutory reor-
ganization. Precedent did exist for the finding of a "D" reorganiza-
tion in a liquidation-reincorporation, but never where the share-
holders of the transferor owned less than eighty percent of the
accomplished by one or more distributions. Indeed, Congress has recognized it is inappropri-
ate to distinguish between complete liquidations involving one distribution and complete
liquidations involving more than one distribution. If a distribution is one of a series of dis-
tributions in redemption of all of the stock of a corporation pursuant to a plan, then each
distribution is treated as in complete liquidation of the corporation. I.R.C. § 346(a) as
amended by, Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §
222(d), 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News (96 Stat.) 324, 479.
111. 39 T.C. at 158-59.
112. Id. at 160.
113. Id. at 160 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.302-1(a)).
114. Id.
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stock of the transferee. As a result, the Commissioner specifically
disavowed reliance on a "D" reorganization. 115 The transaction
failed to conform to the literal requirements of section 368.116
The Tax Court also stated that "Section 1.331-1(c) [of the reg-
ulations] . . [did] not interfere with [its] ultimate conclusion" be-
cause the regulation only applied when the facts constituted a re-
organization." 7  The regulation's reference to section 301 was
explained as further description of section 356(a)(2). Thus, a liqui-
dation followed by a reincorporation could be ignored only when a
reorganization could be found." 8
The dissent, on the other hand, recognized the transaction as a
liquidation-reincorporation device 9 and referred to Congress's in-
tention that such tax avoidance "appropriately be disposed of by
judicial decision, or by regulation within the framework of the
other provisions of the bill."' 0 The dissent found substantial pre-
cedent for considering both "the realities and the substance of
what actually was done,"'' and for "construing and applying the
provisions of the Revenue statutes [to] give effect to their underly-
ing intent and purpose".2 2 This analysis sustained a finding that
no liquidation had occurred; the business enterprise, in reality,
continued uninterrupted. The dissent, therefore, agreed with the
Commissioner's first argument and rejected the majority finding
that the liquidation must be given effect unless the transaction
falls within the reorganization provisions.
115. Id. at 161. He also did not rely on a "C" reorganization. The court assumed that
this was because of the "solely for voting stock" requirement. Whether he advanced an ar-
gument that another kind of reorganization existed is not clear, but the court specifically
stated that the transaction did not constitute an "E" (more took place than a mere "reshuf-
fling of a capital structure, within the framework of an existing corporation") or an "F"
("the shift ...in the proprietary interest of the two corporations was hardly [a] mere
change in identity, form, or place of organization") reorganization. Id. at 162 (citing Helver-
ing v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202 (1942); Stollberg Hardware Co. v. Com-
missioner, 46 B.T.A. 788 (1942)).
116. 39 T.C. at 162.
117. Id. For the text of regulation section 1.331-1(c), see infra text accompanying note
249.
118. 39 T.C. at 163.
119. 39 T.C. 144, 165 (1962) (Pierce, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 165 (citing H. CONF. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (emphasis in
original)). The dissent noted that the Commissioner gave effect to this congressional man-
date by promulgating section 1.331-1(c) of the Treasury Regulations, pertaining to corporate
liquidations. See infra text accompanying notes 248-69.
121. 39 T.C. at 164 (emphasis in original).
122. Id.
1984]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
2. DIVIDEND WITHIN GAIN LIMITATION
Even where the requisite control exists and a court finds a re-
organization, the operative reorganization provision dealing with
the receipt of boot is sometimes inadequate to prevent the bailout
of earnings and profits. Section 356(a)(1) provides that if a share-
holder receives boot1'2  pursuant to a statutory reorganization,
"then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized" to the
extent of the boot. 124 If the transaction "has the effect of the distri-
bution of a dividend, 125 the amount treated as a dividend is "such
an amount of the gain . . . as is not in excess of his ratable share
of the undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation
"126
Liquidation-reincorporation is most attractive to shareholders
of successful corporations who wish to extract accumulated earn-
ings and profits at capital gains rates. In most cases, the sharehold-
ers acquired their equity interest at the inception of the business
and have low-basis stock. The amount of boot distribution, there-
fore, is unlikely to equal or exceed the realized gain on the ex-
change of stock. Accordingly, if the Commissioner succeeds in his
"D" reorganization argument, and if the distribution has the effect
of a dividend,127 the entire amount will be a dividend.
123. "Boot" is accepted jargon for the statutory term "other property or money," which
refers to property other than stock and securities permitted to be received without recogni-
tion of gain. The term "other property," however, also includes the fair market value of the
excess of any principal amount of securities received over the principal amount of any secur-
ities surrendered. I.R.C. § 356(a)(1), (d).
124. I.R.C. § 356(a)(1).
125. I.R.C. § 356(a)(2).
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. The "effect of a dividend" language has been a part of the Code since 1924. Reve-
nue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(d), 43 Stat. 253, 257. Early decisions established an "auto-
matic" dividend rule: if sufficient earnings and profits were present, any distribution of boot
constituted a dividend. Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945). Later
courts rejected the automatic dividend rule and looked to the redemption provisions, I.R.C.
§ 302, to determine whether a distribution was "essentially equivalent to a dividend"; for
example, whether there had been a meaningful reduction in the shareholder's proportionate
interest. See supra note 5. See, e.g., Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793, 797 (Ct. Cl.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959); Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958); see also Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112 (principles
developed under section 302 applicable in determining dividend equivalency under section
356(a)(2)). The cases do not agree, however, on how the principles of section 302 are to be
applied. Compare Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1115 (1979) ("section 356(a)(2) requires a determination of whether the distribu-
tion would have been taxed as a dividend if made prior to the reorganization or if no reor-
ganization had occurred") with Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973) (distri-
bution treated as hypothetical redemption of acquiring corporation's stock). For discussion
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However, a shareholder who purchases stock after the business
has appreciated in value or who acquires stepped-up basis stock
from a decedent 2 8 may have little or no gain on the exchange of
his old stock for new stock. Therefore, even if the boot is distrib-
uted pro rata"' and would otherwise have the effect of the distri-
bution of a dividend, the shareholder will escape dividend treat-
ment with respect to all or a substantial part of the distribution.
It is unlikely that Congress intended this result. The reorgani-
zation provisions operate on the premise that the shareholder's in-
vestment is a continuing one in altered form.130 Therefore, gain
generally is not recognized on the corporate or shareholder
levels,13 and the assets in corporate solution retain a carryover ba-
sis. 18"2 Section 356(a)(2) was designed, albeit imperfectly, to treat
the distribution of boot in a manner consistent with the treatment
of distributions made by ongoing corporations. 33 At least the
courts have interpreted the provision this way. If a shareholder re-
ceives a distribution of boot in a reorganization and the distribu-
tion would have received sale or exchange treatment if made by an
ongoing corporation,3 " any gain realized is capital gain under sec-
tion 356(a)(1). If, however, distributing boot has the effect of a div-
idend, it is treated as such under section 356(a)(2). Whether a dis-
tribution has that effect necessarily must be treated with reference
to distributions made by ongoing corporations.
Obviously, the "dividend within gain" limitation of section
356(a)(2) is inconsistent with the treatment of distributions made
of dividend equivalency under section 356(a)(2), see Gately & Pratt, -Dividend
Equivalency-Are the Tests Changing?, 7 J. CORP. TAx. 53 (1980); Golub, "Boot" in Reor-
ganizations-The Dividend Equivalency Test of Section 356(a)(2), 58 TAXEs 904 (1980);
Rands, Section 356(a)(2): A Study of Uncertainty in Corporate Taxation, 38 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 75 (1983).
128. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (1976) (basis stepped-up to fair market value at date of decedent's
death).
129. See supra note 127.
130. "[The] committee would liberalize present law with respect to the nonrecognition
of gain or loss in cases which involve mere rearrangement of the corporate structure while at
the same time providing less liberal rules in other areas .. " S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.
2d Sess. 42, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 4621, 4673.
131. Section 354(a) provides for no gain or loss to shareholders in a reorganization "if
stock or securities . . . are . . . exchanged solely for stock or securities .... " Section
361(a) contains a similar rule for a corporation that exchanges property for stock or securi-
ties in another corporation if both are parties to a reorganization.
132. I.R.C. § 381; see supra note 24.
133. Generally, a distribution supported by earnings and profits will be a dividend un-
less it represents the proceeds of a substantial corporate contraction or results in a substan-
tial shift of shareholder interest. I.R.C. §§ 301, 316.
134. See supra note 127.
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by ongoing corporations. Nevertheless, the statutory language is
free from ambiguity, which probably accounts for the absence of
litigation over the dividend within gain limitation. Presumably,
there have been situations where this limitation has frustrated the
Service in liquidation-reincorporations. 185 Adopting the approach
of the treasury regulations and the Davant case136 would eliminate
(in the context of liquidation-reincorporation and otherwise) this
inconsistency in the treatment of distributions made pursuant to a
reorganization from those made in the regular course of affairs of
an ongoing corporation.
3. DIVIDEND LIMITED TO EARNINGS AND PROFITS OF ONE
CORPORATION
Dividend treatment under section 356(a)(2) is limited to the
shareholder's "ratable share of the undistributed earnings and
profits of the corporation .... ,137 This language is not difficult to
interpret when a liquidation-reincorporation involves only one cor-
poration that has accumulated earnings and profits, as when the
liquidation of one corporation precedes the reincorporation of an-
other or when shareholders create a new corporation to purchase
the operating assets of the liquidating corporation. But when the
same shareholders control multiple active corporations and each
corporation has earnings and profits, a literal interpretation of the
statutory language will allow the bailout of earnings and profits.
For example, assume that two active corporations, X and Y, with
earnings and profits and substantial liquid assets, are owned by the
same shareholders in the same proportion. If X sells its operating
assets to Y for cash and then liquidates, distributing the sale pro-
ceeds and other liquid assets previously accumulated by X, the
shareholders have effectively withdrawn earnings and profits from
both corporations. Since section 356(a)(2) is couched in the singu-
lar, a literal interpretation would limit dividend treatment to the
earnings and profits of one or the two corporations, presumably X,
135. For example, assume in a liquidation-reincorporation, which is recharacterized as a
"D" reorganization, that there are two shareholders, A and B, who retain their percentage of
stock ownership. Each receives $50,000 in boot. A has low-basis stock and a realized gain of
$100,000 on the exchange. Assuming sufficient earnings and profits, he will have dividend
income of $50,000. B has high-basis stock, having acquired it from a decedent, and realizes
only a $10,000 dividend. Obviously, if the same distribution had been made by an ongoing
corporation, each would have had dividend income of $50,000.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 143-90.
137. I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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the "distributing" corporation. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has rejected such a rigid approach, at least where there is
complete identity of shareholders.
The statute in speaking of "the corporation" means the cor-
poration controlled by the shareholders receiving the distribu-
tion. Where there is complete identity, as here, the stockholders
controlled both corporations and it is virtually impossible to tell
which corporation is in reality "the corporation" distributing the
cash. We have two corporations each one of which is distributing
cash; therefore, we must look to the earnings and profits of both
corporations to see if the distribution is essentially equivalent to
a dividend or has the effect of a dividend.88
The Tax Court, however, has rejected the Fifth Circuit's anal-
ysis. 139 Relying on the reference to a single corporation and the ex-
ample contained in the House Report that accompanied the prede-
cessor of section 356(a)(2),'O the Tax Court concluded that
"Congress did not seem to consider that there could be, under cer-
tain circumstances, a bailout of. . . the transferee as well. 1 41 The
court rejected the Service's argument that a flexible interpretation
was necessary "to effectuate a 'broad Congressional' intent, in or-
der to prevent bail-out." 4" Although recognizing that this was a
possible loophole, the court found the statutory language too clear
to adopt such a strained interpretation. It was left to Congress to
correct the deficiency. Although the Fifth Circuit's holding seems
more consistent with the broad congressional intent to prevent
bailouts, the matter remains unresolved and continues to limit the
effectiveness of the step transaction "D" reorganization as a
weapon against liquidation-reincorporation.
IV. AVOIDING THE LIMITATIONS OF THE "D" REORGANIZATION
A. Revenue Ruling 61-156
As noted, the control requirement provides the most serious
obstacle to the Service in its attempts to prevent liquidation-
reincorporation bailouts. Revenue Ruling 61-156 4s incorporates
138. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874, 889 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1022 (1967).
139. American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204 (1970).
140. Id. at 230 (citing H. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1924)).
141. Id. at 230. The court also stated that a reading of sections 354 and 356 supported a
singular interpretation of the term "transferor."
142. Id. at 230-31.
143. 1961-2 C.B. 62.
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the Service's strongest arguments in its efforts to combat liquida-
tion-reincorporation where the continuity of ownership is insuffi-
cient to meet the requirements of a statutory "D" reorganization.
In the ruling, a corporation adopted a plan of complete liquidation
and sold substantially all its assets to a new corporation, which the
management of the selling corporation had formed. The considera-
tion for the purchase of the assets was forty-five percent of the
stock in the new corporation, along with some cash and notes. The
selling corporation then liquidated, distributing to its shareholders
the stock, cash, and notes together with other assets of the liqui-
dating corporation. Immediately thereafter the new corporation
sold the remaining fifty-five percent of its stock in a public offer-
ing. While these transactions were taking place, the business con-
tinued uninterrupted. Applying the step transaction doctrine and
examining the situation before and after the transactions, no reor-
ganization occurred because the shareholders of the transferor cor-
poration did not control the transferee. Absent another theory, ap-
plication of the relevant statutory provisions would result in the
following tax consequences: (1) the shareholders would treat the
distributions received from the liquidating corporation as capital
gains;1 4 4 (2) the liquidating corporation would recognize no gain or
loss on the sale of the corporate assets; 145 and (3) the basis of the
operating assets would be stepped-up to fair market value."
After citing Treasury Regulation section 1.331-1(c), 1 4 7 the rul-
ing suggested that the issuance of stock to the public be disre-
garded as a separate transaction "since even without it the domi-
nant purpose-to withdraw corporate earnings while continuing
the equity interest in substantial part in a business enterprise con-
ducted in corporate form-was fully achieved.'" The transaction
was "'a device whereby it has been attempted to withdraw corpo-
rate earnings at capital gains rates by distributing all the assets of
a corporation in complete liquidation and promptly reincorporat-
ing' them."149 Congress did not intend that such distributions es-
144. I.R.C. § 331(a).
145. I.R.C. § 337.
146. I.R.C. § 1012.
147. Tress. Reg. § 1.331-1(c) provides: A liquidation which is followed by a transfer to
another corporation of all or part of the assets of the liquidating corporation or which is
preceded by such a transfer may, however, have the effect of the distribution of a dividend
or of a transaction in which no loss is recognized and gain is recognized to the extent of
"other property." See sections 301 and 356.
148. 1961-2 C.B. at 63.
149. Id. (quoting H. CONG. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41); see supra note 32
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cape dividend treatment nor that the selling corporation escape
recognition of gain on the sale of its assets. "In substance there
was no reality to the 'sale' of corporate assets or to the 'liquidation'
of the selling corporation since each was only a formal step in a
reorganization of the existing corporation.' ' 10
The ruling concluded that the transaction constituted both an
"E" and an "F" reorganization. The old corporation did not recog-
nize gain or loss, and the new corporation took the operating assets
with a carryover basis. The shareholders recognized no gain or loss
on the exchange of stock in the old corporation for stock in the
new corporation,' 5' but "withdrawal of money and other property
from the corporate solution" constituted a dividend under section
301.152 Under this analysis, the dividend would not be limited to
and accompanying text.
150. 1961-2 C.B. at 63. The Ruling dismissed as not dispositive that the shareholders of
the old corporation owned only 45% of the new corporation's stock, relying on authority
that the continuity-of-interest requirement in a reorganization can be met when the share-
holders of an acquiring corporation received less than half of the stock of the acquiring
corporation. John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1936) (shareholders of the tar-
get company received only non-voting preferred stock). The Service's reliance on this case is
misplaced and does not address the courts' rationale for denying reorganization status to
this kind of transaction. In Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962), discussed supra
at text accompanying notes 99-22, and in other cases the issue has been whether the trans-
actions, when viewed as a whole, met one of the specific statutory definitions for a reorgani-
zation. The continuity-of-interest requirement is rarely at issue. Further, the ruling applied
the wrong test for measuring continuity of interest. One does not look at the transferor's
shareholders' percentage of ownership in the acquiring corporation because such percentage
figure would be quite small anytime a large corporation acquires a small one, even if the
shareholders of the target company receive only stock of the acquiring company. Rather, the
test is what percentage of the total consideration received by such shareholders constitutes
an equity interest. A "B" reorganization requires that solely voting stock be used as consid-
eration. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B). A "C" reorganization effectively requires that 80% of the
consideration employed be voting stock. I.R.C. § 366(a)(1)(C), (2)(B). If any other consider-
ation is used, then the liabilities assumed by the acquiring corporation are also counted
toward the 20% limit on other consideration. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(B). The Service has taken
the position that a 50% test should be used where no other is specified: at least 50% of the
total consideration received by the shareholders of the acquired company must be equity in
the acquiring company. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568; Rev. Rul. 66-224, 1966-2 C.B. 114.
There has been much criticism of the inconsistencies in the continuity-of-interest require-
ment in the reorganization provisions. See, e.g., Committee on Corporate Stockholder Rela-
tionships, Tax Section Recommendation No. 1981-5: To Amend the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 to Simplify, Redefine and Make More Uniform the Various Forms of Acquisitive
Corporate Reorganizations, 34 TAx LAW 1386 (1981) (proposal that continuity-of-interest
requirement is met in acquisitive reorganizations ("A," "B," or "C") if 50% of the consider-
ation is "qualifying consideration"); Jacobs, supra note 30, at 422-28 (advocating adoption
of a uniform statutory test for continuity of interest).
151. I.R.C. § 354.
152. 1961-2 C.B. at 64. In considering the distribution of money and other property a
separate transaction, the ruling relied on sections 1.301-1(1), 1.331-1(c) of the Treasury Reg-
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the gain on the exchange or to one corporation's earnings and prof-
its if more than one corporation is involved.
Revenue Ruling 61-156 raises several unanswered questions.
The finding of either an "E" or an "F" reorganization is possible
only if the exchange of stock, withdrawal of liquid assets, and issu-
ance of stock are treated as independent transactions. " Presuma-
bly, that approach would be necessary to find an "F" reorganiza-
tion,"' which most authorities agree requires a complete identity
of ownership at the shareholder level. 155 If so, why was no mention
made of a "D" reorganization with the less stringent control re-
quirement? Even less clear is the conclusion that an "E" reorgani-
zation is present. The Code simply describes an "E" reorganization
as a "recapitalization"1 6 without further elaboration. The term,
however, has always been understood to encompass a shift in the
capital structure of one corporation.157
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the ruling represents a sig-
nificant attempt by the Service to employ Treasury Regulations
sections 1.301-1(1) and 1.331-1(c) and the "functionally unrelated"
analysis to combat the liquidation-reincorporation device. "
B. Davant v. Commissioner
Of the leading cases dealing with the liquidation-reincorpora-
tion transaction, Davant v. Commissioner5 9 comes closest to ac-
cepting the underlying theory of Revenue Ruling 61-156 and the
regulations. In Davant, two families owned two corporations,
ulations. See infra text accompanying notes 248-49.
153. Although the ruling states that the public offering should be "disregarded," 1961-2
C.B. at 63, the Service has treated the ruling as precedent for separate treatment of aspects
of a transaction that are functionally unrelated. See Nicholson, supra note 17, at A-11.
154. Defined as "a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization of one corpo-
ration, however effected . . . ." I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(F).
155. See supra note 41.
156. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(E).
157. A recapitalization is a "reshuffling of a capital structure within the framework of
an existing corporation . . . " Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202
(1942). The examples contained in Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(e)(1)-(5) all involve only one corpo-
ration. Finally, section 381, which provides for the carryover of tax attributes in statutory
reorganizations, does not apply to "E" reorganizations. Section 381 is premised on the belief
that the tax attributes of a disappearing corporation should be carried over to the acquiring
or surviving corporation because any change in the business is one of form rather than sub-
stance. In an "E" reorganization, there is in reality no change in form or substance.
158. The applicability of these regulations and the "functionally unrelated" analysis to
liquidation-reincorporation is discussed in greater detail infra at text accompanying notes
248-69.
159. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
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Warehouse and Water, in substantially the same proportion.6 0
Some of the stockholders consulted an attorney, Bruce, about the
possibility of transferring Warehouse's assets to Water for $700,000
and then liquidating Warehouse. Bruce advised that the Service
would probably take the position that the shareholders had re-
ceived a dividend instead of capital gain.' 61 The parties adopted an
alternative plan whereby the shareholders sold their Warehouse
shares to a straw man'" for $914,200.1'3 Pursuant to the plan,
Water then bought the Warehouse assets for $700,000. The straw
man caused Warehouse to liquidate, receiving the $700,000 pro-
ceeds from the asset sale plus approximately $230,000 in bank ac-
counts previously held by Warehouse. He paid off the loan and re-
tained the balance.' 4 All transactions necessary to accomplish this
plan1" took place in Bruce's office in the course of one hour.
The shareholders of Warehouse reported the transaction as a
capital gain derived from a bona fide sale of their stock. The Com-
missioner responded by characterizing the series of transactions as
a corporate reorganization.166 The sale proceeds, he argued, were
dividends to the extent of the earnings and profits of both Water
and Warehouse.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, cognizant of con-
gressional intent to treat distributions to stockholders of ongoing
corporations as dividends,' e" stated that "[i]n order to effectuate
* * * [that] intent . . ., the dividend, liquidation, redemption and
reorganization sections of the Code must be examined and viewed
160. Water owned and operated an irrigation canal system to irrigate ricelands that
Water owned and leased to a partnership, Farms. Farms's partners were also stockholders of
Warehouse and Water, and their partnership interests were in substantially the same pro-
portion as their stockholdings. Farms subleased the ricelands to tenant farmers under the
arrangement where Farms retained 50% of the production as payment in lieu of rent. Farms
was the principal source of rice for Warehouse. Id. at 877.
161. Id. at 878. Presumably on the grounds that under the step-transaction doctrine,
these transactions would constitute a "D" or an "F" reorganization.
162. The straw man, or conduit, was the attorney's son, Bruce, Jr. Id. at 878.
163. The money was borrowed from a bank with which both corporations had accounts
and was secured by the Warehouse stock. Id.
164. Bruce, Jr. "earned" over $15,580 for his efforts. Id. Not bad for one hour's work.
165. These included making of the loan, sale of the stock, election of new Warehouse
corporate officials, sale of the Warehouse assets, liquidation of Warehouse, and repayment
of the loan. Id. at 879.
166. Id. The Tax Court found that the transaction constituted a "D" reorganization,
but held that the gain was a taxable dividend only to the extent of the earnings and profits
of the liquidating corporation. South Texas Rice Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.
540, 569-70 (1965).
167. 366 F.2d at 879.
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as a functional whole." 168 Applying this interpretation, the court
recognized that the sole purpose of this series of transactions was
to convert what would otherwise have been ordinary dividend in-
come into capital gains. Thus, the taxpayers' characterization of
the transaction as a bona fide sale was rejected:
The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a
transaction .... A sale by one person cannot be transformed
for tax purposes into a sale by another by using the latter as a
conduit through which to pass title. To permit the true nature
of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist
solely to alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair the effective
administration of the tax policies of Congress. 6 9
The taxpayers urged alternatively that, even if the sale was
disregarded, the complete liquidation of Warehouse entitled them
to capital gains treatment under section 331. In addition, they as-
serted that the gain on the sale of Warehouse's operating assets to
Water would not be recognized under section 337.170 The court
noted that, although the taxpayers framed the transaction within
the literal terms of section 331, there was ample precedent for re-
fusing such treatment where the transaction served only to avoid
taxes. 171 In analyzing the substance of the transactions, the court
found three separate occurrences: (1) $700,000 in Water earnings
and profits were obtained by the shareholders; (2) $200,000 in
earnings and profits were obtained from Warehouse; and (3) the
operating assets of Warehouse and Water were consolidated.1 7 2 Of
168. Although the court did not rely on Treasury Regulations sections 1.301-1(1) and
1.331-1(c), the "functionally unrelated" analysis employs the same rationale as the regula-
tions: the interrelationship between the various Code provisions, and the underlying con-
gressional intent that distributions from ongoing corporations be treated as dividends.
169. 366 F.2d at 881 (quoting Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334
(1954)).
170. 366 F.2d at 881. Section 337 provides that if a corporation adopts a plan of com-
plete liquidation and distributes all its assets in complete liquidation within 12 months after
the date of adoption, no gain or loss shall be recognized on the sale of its property during
that time. See supra text accompanying notes 45-61.
171. Id. The court cited and discussed both Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935),
and Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947), noting that in Gregory, the Court refused
to give effect to the taxpayer's literal compliance with the reorganization provisions "on the
ground that the transaction had served no function other than that of a contrivance to bail
out corporate earnings at capital gains tax rates." 366 F.2d at 882. The Fifth Circuit also
stated that the Supreme Court in Bazley "again refused to give effect to a corporate trans-
action which complied precisely with the formal requirements for a nontaxable corporate
reorganization, on the ground that the transaction was an attempt to bail out corporate
earnings." Id. at 882 n.19.
172. 366 F.2d at 882.
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these, only the combination of the two corporations' assets was
found to serve a legitimate purpose; the taxpayers made no at-
tempt to furnish a non tax-avoidance motive for the cash distribu-
tions. 17  Because the reorganization provisions would have allowed
nonrecognition of gain on the combination, without the necessity
of the $900,000 distribution to the shareholders,17 4 it was apparent
to the court that "no functional relationship"17 5 existed between
the extraction of the $900,000 in liquid assets and the transfer of
Warehouse's operating assets to Water. Since Warehouse's opera-
tions were continued without interruption using the same operat-
ing assets,1 7 6 the court viewed the taxpayers' "plan as a whole to
the extent that the parts are functionally related, and not its con-
stituent parts individually...," and concluded that no liquida-
tion under section 331 had occurred. The series of transactions
constituted both an "F 17'  and a "D '17 9 reorganization. Alterna-
tively, the court concluded that under the "functionally unrelated"
analysis the earnings and profits of Warehouse, as well as those of
Water, should be used in determining whether the full $900,000
received by the shareholders constituted a dividend under section
301,180 declared incident to a reorganization.1 81 The court cited
173. Id.
174. The $700,000 from Water's earnings and profits was obtained by unnecessarily
casting the transfer of operating assets in the form of a sale. The sale of Warehouse stock to
Bruce Jr. extracted $200,000 of Warehouse's earnings and profits.
175. 366 F.2d at 882 (emphasis added).
176. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d), applicable to acquisitions occurring after January 30,
1981, provides that continuity-of-business enterprise is satisfied if the acquiring corporation
either continues the historic business of the acquired corporation or uses a significant por-
tion of the acquired corporation's historic assets in a business.
177. 366 F.2d at 883.
178. The court found that, although Water was an existing corporation with assets of
its own at the time of the transactions, Water was merely the alter ego of Warehouse. From
the point of view of the shareholders, it made no difference whether Water or Warehouse
held the assets. Therefore, the court held that "[a]t least where there is a complete identity
of shareholders and their proprietary interests, as here, .. the type of transaction involved
is a type (F) reorganization." Id. at 884.
179. The taxpayers argued that there could be no finding of a "D" reorganization be-
cause they received no new stock in Water as required by section 368(a)(1)(D). The Davant
court pointed out, however, that this provision has never been construed literally. 366 F.2d
at 884; see also supra text accompanying notes 94-95. Since the same stockholders owned all
the stock of both Water and Warehouse, "the issuance of new stock would have been a
meaningless gesture." 366 F.2d at 887 (quoting Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676, 680
(3d Cir. 1961)). "[T]he appreciation of the value of Water's stock certificates caused by the
transfer of Warehouse's operating assets to Water was the equivalent of issuing $700,000
worth of new or additional stock to Water's stockholders." 366 F.2d at 886.
180. The court discussed two alternative rationales for its holding. Under section
356(a)(2), boot received as part of a reorganization is taxed as a dividend to the extent of
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Bazley v. Commissioner'2 as authority for treating the amount of
the distribution as dividends under section 301 (rather than 356)
because the distribution of liquid assets was unrelated to the
transfer of operating assets, i.e., the reorganization.'
The court also held that the term "the corporation" as used in
section 356(a)(2) meant both corporations where there was a com-
plete identity of stock ownership and it was virtually impossible to
tell which corporation was in reality "the corporation" distributing
the cash. 84 Other courts have felt constrained to interpret the
term "the corporation" in the singular and have limited dividend
treatment to the earnings and profits of only one of the
corporations. 8 5
Since the court did indeed find that a reorganization existed
and that the taxpayers received dividends from both corporations
under its interpretation of section 356(a)(2), the functionally unre-
lated analysis was an "alternative rationale" for its decision.' 85 The
gain and the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation. The court held that, in
this case, there were two distributing corporations, with Warehouse serving as a mere con-
duit for the $700,000 distribution from Water. For further discussion of this aspect of Da-
vant, see infra text accompanying notes 182-90. Alternatively, section 482 authorizes alloca-
tion of tax attributes between "two or more organizations, trades, or businesses ... owned
or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests" where necessary to prevent tax
evasion. I.R.C. § 482. The court held that "[nlo clearer evasion of taxes can be imagined
than converting what would be a dividend taxable at ordinary rates into a capital gain by
merely passing it through another corporate shell." 366 F.2d at 889.
181. 366 F.2d at 888.
182. 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
183. Davant contains no reference to sections 1.301-1(1) and 1.331-1(c) of the regula-
tions, although both are consistent with the "functionally unrelated" analysis. Regulation
section 1.301-1(L) provides in relevant part:
A distribution to shareholders with respect to their stock is within the terms of
section 301 although it takes place at the same time as another transaction if
the distribution is in substance a separate transaction whether or not connected
in a formal sense. This is most likely to occur in the case of a recapitalization, a
reincorporation, or a merger of a corporation with a newly organized corporation
having substantially no property.
(Emphasis added).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 137-43.
185. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
186. The court employed three separate theories to reach its decision; it made no differ-
ence whether the result was reached by characterizing the transaction as a type "D" or type
"F" reorganization (presumably with dividend consequences flowing from section 356), or a
dividend declared simultaneously with a reorganization. 366 F.2d at 887-88. The separate
rationales for the result were set forth "in order to avoid future confusion." Id. at 888.
Because the court did find that the transactions constituted both a "D" and an "F" reorgan-
ization, it appears that the functionally unrelated analysis was unnecessary to the decision.
Perhaps the court was looking ahead to a situation where a liquidation-reincorporation
transaction could not be characterized as a reorganization under the step transaction doc-
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court rejected the taxpayers' position that the court was inconsis-
tent in integrating the sale of Warehouse assets and the "sale-liq-
uidation" of the Warehouse stock while at the same time separat-
ing the distribution of Water's cash to its shareholders. The court
was "merely recognizing that two distinct and functionally unre-
lated types of transactions were carried on simultaneously-one
was a dividend and the other a reorganization. ' 187 Water could
have declared a $700,000 cash dividend at some later time. There-
fore, the $700,000 received was a distribution governed by sections
301 and 316. The same reasoning dictated a conclusion that the
$200,000 coming from Warehouse was "a dividend since it was
functionally unrelated to the reorganization. '" 188 Although Ware-
house was liquidated and could not have distributed the $200,000
after the reorganization, this amount could have been transferred
to Water. Because Water acquired Warehouse's earnings and prof-
its under section 381, a subsequent distribution of $200,000 would
have constituted a dividend.189 Although the court employed two
alternative grounds for reaching its conclusion that both the
$700,000 received from Water and the $200,000 received from
Warehouse were to be treated as dividends by the recipients,190 the
"functionally unrelated" analysis was the most significant depar-
ture from prior law.
B. American Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner
The Tax Court specifically rejected the Fifth Circuit's "func-
tionally unrelated" analysis in American Manufacturing Co. v.
Commissioner.1 91 The taxpayer was a successor to the parent
(Safety) of two subsidiaries, one foreign (ISI) and one domestic
trine because the statutory requirements for a reorganization (most likely the control re-
quirement) were not met. The "functionally unrelated" test would support dividend treat-
ment for liquid assets extracted from the liquidating company by the continuing
shareholders, even when, as in Gallagher, enough new equity ownership was present (more
than 20%) to break the control requirement.
187. 366 F.2d at 888.
188. Id.
189. The court observed that the legislative history of section 381 indicated that it "was
enacted . . . to provide a comprehensive set of rules for preservation of merging corpora-
tions' tax attributes, such as earnings and profits. This preservation was to be 'based upon
economic realities rather than upon such artificialities as the legal form of the reorganiza-
tion.'" 366 F.2d at 888-89 n.28 (quoting S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 52, reprinted
in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621).
190. See supra note 180.
191. 55 T.C. 204 (1970).
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(Pintsch).192 Pintsch's business declined,19s and while ISI's busi-
ness could have been expanded into new markets, Safety's man-
agement declined to make the necessary expenditures for such a
move. 194 In 1958, after Safety's management abandoned plans that
would have resulted in the liquidation of both subsidiaries,1e
Pintsch sold its operating assets to ISI for $286,060 and the as-
sumption of Pintsch's liabilities. 96 After the sale, Pintsch's only
assets-cash and receivables-were distributed to its parent,
Safety, and Pintsch was liquidated.
American Manufacturing, Safety's successor, argued that the
liquidation fell within section 332, which provides for nonrecogni-
tion of gain or loss to a parent company on the "complete liquida-
tion" of a subsidiary. 97 The Commissioner's response was that no
"complete liquidation" of Pintsch had occurred since ISI contin-
ued Pintsch's business; therefore, section 332 did not apply. 9 He
192. Safety was primarily engaged in the manufacture of railway equipment. Pintsch,
the domestic subsidiary, sold gas to railroads for the lighting of passenger, baggage, and
postal cars. After 1951 all of its customers were Canadian. Id. at 206. The foreign subsidiary,
ISI, was organized in Canada and marketed gas products in Canada, principally bottled
propane gas for home and individual use. Id. at 208.
193. Id. at 207.
194. Id. at 208.
195. In 1957, ISI agreed to sell its assets to Superior Propane, Ltd., an unrelated corpo-
ration. The Service had issued a favorable ruling that the sale and subsequent liquidation
would be exempt from United States income tax under sections 332 and 367. The proposed
sale was never consummated. Id. at 208. Safety then proposed to have ISI acquire the oper-
ating assets of Pintsch, followed by a simultaneous liquidation of the two subsidiaries. The
Service again issued a favorable ruling. Id. at 209.
196. Id. at 209-10. ISI continued Pintsch's business without interruption.
197. I.R.C. § 332 provides in relevant part:
(a) General rule
No gain or loss shall be recognized on the receipt by a corporation of property
distributed in complete liquidation of another corporation.
(b) Liquidation to which section applies.
For purposes of subsection (a), a distribution shall be considered to be in com-
plete liquidation only if-
(1) the corporation receiving such property was, on the date of the adoption of the plan of
liquidation, and has continued to be at all times until the receipt of the property, the owner
of stock (in such other corporation) possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and the owner of at least 80 percent of
the total number of shares of all other classes of stock (except nonvoting stock which is
limited and preferred as to dividends); and either (2) the distribution is by such other cor-
poration in complete cancellation or redemption of all its stock, and the transfer of all the
property occurs within the taxable year; in such case the adoption by the shareholders of
the resolution under which is authorized the distribution of all the assets of such corpora-
tion in complete cancellation or redemption of all its stock shall be considered an adoption
of a plan of liquidation, even though no time for the completion of the transfer of the prop-
erty is specified in such resolution; or . . ..
198. 55 T.C. at 214.
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further argued that the distributions'99 from Pintsch and ISI re-
ceived pursuant to the so-called "liquidation" were taxable as divi-
dends under sections 301 and 31600 or, alternatively, under section
356(a)(2).201
With respect to the contention that distributions were taxable
as dividends under section 356(a)(2), the government contended
that both subsidiaries were transferors.0 2 Therefore, the Commis-
sioner argued that the amount received from both subsidiaries
should be treated as dividends to the extent such distributions
were supported by earnings and profits.20 3 The court recognized
that the issues were highly complex and technical, and similar to
those previously considered at the trial court level in Davant.20 4
However, the court had never considered the application of the re-
organization provisions to a fact situation that also fell within the
nonrecognition provisions of section 332.205 American contended
that section 332 took precedence over the reorganization provi-
sions, and that the Service could not apply the step transaction
doctrine to a fact situation falling within the coverage of that pro-
vision. It argued that a "complete liquidation" under section 332
occurred merely upon the dissolution of a subsidiary whether or
not, as here, the operating assets had been transferred to another
subsidiary of the common parent.0
The court rejected the taxpayer's first argument that a trans-
action falling within the purview of section 332 could not be a reor-
ganization,0 7 and held that if a liquidation of a subsidiary into a
199. The Commissioner theorized that ISI's stock increased in value when ISI acquired
Pintsch's operating assets, and "this alleged increase in the stock's value was tantamount to
the issuance of $286,060.94 in ISI stock which was 'received' by Safety." 55 T.C. at 215-16.
Therefore, this hypothetical stock should have been added to the distributions that Safety
received. Id. at 216.
200. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
201. The Commissioner conceded that the dividend received deduction under section
243(a) was applicable. Id. at 215. However, at the time of the transaction in question, sec-
tion 243 provided that a parent corporation could deduct only 85% of the dividends re-
ceived from its wholly-owned subsidiary. The court noted that section 243 was amended in
1962, and the deduction was increased to 100%. Id. at 221 n.17.
202. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
203. 55 T.C. at 216.
204. Id. (citing South Tex. Rice Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 540 (1954),
rev'd in part and af'd in part sub nom. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967)).
205. In prior cases decided by the Tax Court, the taxpayers were the shareholders of
the liquidating corporation who sought to be taxed at capital gains rates under section 331
or its predecessors. 55 T.C. at 216-17.
206. Id. at 217.
207. American argued that section 332 would be superfluous if the reorganization provi-
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parent were merely one step in a series of steps which constituted
a reorganization, it was unnecessary to decide whether section 332
would otherwise be applicable.2"
The taxpayer argued alternatively that, even if these steps
constituted a reorganization, Pintsch was merely in the process of
"winding up" and therefore, the reorganization provisions did not
apply. 209 The court, however, distinguished this situation from two
cases on which the taxpayer relied. In both Graham v. Commis-
sioner2 10 and Standard Realization Co. v. Commissioner," the
transferee corporation disposed of the assets of the transferor cor-
poration and did not constitute the business of the transferor. The
Pintsch business only terminated when the transferred contracts
did because it was no longer economically feasible to continue the
existence of the business.2 2 There was no plan, as in Graham and
sions applied to parent-subsidiary liquidations. However, the court noted that the cases on
which American relied did not support its contention, since they indicated that, in the ab-
sence of section 332, "the liquidation of a subsidiary into its parent, not preceded by other
intracorporate transactions and stock transfers, would be taxed at capital gains rates under
section 331 . . . whether or not cast in the form of a 'merger or consolidation' which quali-
fies under section 368(a)(1)(A) . . . ." 55 T.C. at 218-19. Relying on the legislative history of
section 332, the court noted that it was "intended to cover an area in which the reorganiza-
tion nonrecognition provisions are inapplicable to a 'statutory merger or consolidation'
under section 368(a)(1)(A) that, in substance and effect, is no more than a liquidation of a
subsidiary into its parent with all assets going to the parent." Id. at 219. The court found no
authority for the proposition that section 332 was exclusive, or that a liquidation of a sub-
sidiary into a parent could not be a step in a reorganization falling within another type of
reorganization defined in section 368 other than 368(a)(1)(A). Therefore, "liquidation treat-
ment under section 332 may be precluded when said liquidation is merely a step, or a part
of a plan in a reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(D), even if, in the absence of the reor-
ganization, section 332 would be applicable." Id. at 220.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Quealy criticized the majority's finding that the transac-
tion in question was not governed by section 332. Id. at 234-38 (Quealy, J., dissenting). He
noted that the majority's opinion did not serve the purpose of the reorganization provisions,
because there could be no bailout of earnings and profits at capital gains rates as there is in
a section 331 liquidation. Further, the majority's decision seriously undermined the policy
embodied in section 332 of encouraging the simplification of corporate structures.
208. 55 T.C. at 220. The taxpayer asserted that there was no reorganization because
there was no exchange or distribution of ISI's stock, nor did Pintsch transfer "substantially
all" of its assets as section 354 requires. The court held that, since Safety already owned all
of ISI's stock, any exchange or distribution would have been a meaningless gesture. Id. at
221; see supra text accompanying notes 94-95. With respect to the second contention, the
court held that it was sufficient that substantially all of the operating assets had been trans-
ferred. 55 T.C. at 221-22; see supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
209. It was submitted that the sale of the Pintsch assets to ISI was merely to allow ISI
to avoid the recapture provisions of the Canadian income tax law, and not to continue
Pintsch's business. 55 T.C. at 222.
210. 37 B.T.A. 623 (1938).
211. 10 T.C. 708 (1945).
212. 55 T.C. at 224.
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Standard Realization, to utilize the transferee as a vehicle for the
sale of the transferor's assets. The plan was "to eliminate Pintsch
as an American corporation and continue its operations, albeit not
indefinitely, as a Canadian subsidiary." ''1 The court stated that
the essence of [a statutory reorganization] is a continuance of
the proprietary interests in the continuing enterprise under
modified corporate form, the transaction being deemed insuffi-
ciently closed economically to justify a tax at the time, except in
so far as the stockholder gets something in addition to stock or
securities in the reorganized company. " '
The court found that Pintsch's transfer of assets to ISI and ISI's
continued use of those assets fell within this line of reasoning and
that, therefore, a reorganization had occurred.2 1
Having found the existence of a reorganization, the court
turned to the issue of how to treat the distributions received by
Safety. The Tax Court noted that in its prior considerations of this
issue216 it applied section 356(a)(2) and found that a dividend ex-
isted only to the extent of the earnings and profits of the trans-
feror corporation, in this case Pintsch. The Commissioner urged
the court to reconsider that position in light of Davant.21 7 Since
the distributions from the liquidation were functionally unrelated
to the reorganization, he argued, their treatment should be gov-
erned by section 301 and not by section 356. The Tax Court re-
viewed Davant in detail, quoting that portion of the opinion that
contained the "functionally unrelated" analysis.2 8
The Tax Court, however, disagreed with the reasoning of the
Fifth Circuit in Davant. Although the distributions in both cases
were functionally unrelated to the respective reorganizations, in
the sense that a dividend could have been declared before the se-
ries of steps that constituted the reorganization, the distributions
were not so unrelated to the reorganizations that section 301 ap-
plied instead of section 356.21' The court reviewed the legislative
213. Id.
214. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 648 (1st Cir. 1949)).
215. Even after most of ISI's original properties were sold or leased, Pintsch's former
business was continued. Id.
216. Wilson v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 334 (1966); South Tex. Rice Warehouse Co. v.
Commissioner, 43 T.C. 540 (1965); James Armour, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 295 (1964).
217. Davant, 366 F.2d 874. For a detailed discussion of that case, see supra text accom-
panying notes 159-90.
218. 55 T.C. at 225-26. The court also acknowledged the alternative holding in Davant
that section 356(a)(2) governed. Id. at 226.
219. Id. at 226.
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history of the predecessor of section 356(a)(2) and concluded that
the purpose of that section was to deal with distributions made, as
in Davant and American Manufacturing, where "money or other
property" could have been given beforehand as a dividend.220
The Tax Court concluded that the distributions from Pintsch
and ISI should be treated under section 356(a)(2) since "[they
were made in connection with an overall scheme of events, consti-
tuting a section 368(a)(1)(D) reorganization and fall within the in-
tent and purposes of section 356(a)(2) treatment." '' The court
also disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's and the Commissioner's reli-
ance on Bazley v.Commissioner22 2 and Gregory v. Helvering.25 Al-
though both cases applied the predecessors of section 301, both
found that no reorganization had occurred.224 Here, there was a
finding that a statutory "D" reorganization had taken place.225 The
court also rejected the Commissioner's alternative contention that
a hypothetical ISI stock dividend was distributed to Pintsch and in
turn to Safety.2" The court found this reasoning fallacious because
the transferee of the operating assets transferred an equivalent
amount of cash in payment therefor, with the result that the two
220. Id. The Tax Court reviewed the legislative history in detail. Id. at 226-28.
221. Id. at 228.
222. 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
223. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
224. 55 T.C. at 229.
225. Id. at 224.
226. Id. at 229. The argument of the Commissioner was also based on Davant. The
rationale for respondent's first contention is found in Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d at
886, wherein the court stated:
"Before the transaction the operating assets' value of Warehouse was reflected in
the value of its stock. Similarly, the operating assets' value of Water was re-
flected in the value of its stock. The stockholders had both stocks and their
combined certificates reflected the value of their combined operating assets. Af-
ter the transaction petitioners only had the stock of Water, but it then reflected
the value of the combined operating assets of Water and Warehouse. Therefore,
the appreciation of the value of Water's stock certificates caused by the transfer
of Warehouse's operating assets to Water was the equivalent of issuing $700,000
worth of new or additional stock to Water's stockholders [footnote omitted]."
We are unable to follow this reasoning in the instant case. Here, as in Davant,
the operating assets were transferred but this was not the sole event that oc-
curred. The transferee also transferred the fair market value of the assets in cash
to the transferor. There was, therefore, an offset to the value of operating assets
received by transferee and the "value" of the transferee's stock remained the
same. Hence, the hypothesis that there was an appreciation in the value of ISI's
stock is fallacious, and the foundation for asserting that an additional hypotheti-
cal value of stock was transferred to Pintsch and then to Safety does not hold
"water."
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transactions were a "wash," at least insofar as the value of the
transferee's stock was concerned.2 2
In addition, the court rejected an interpretation of "the [dis-
tributing] corporation" in section 356(a)(2) to include ISI as well
as Pintsch, so that distributions from each could be considered
dividends to the extent of their respective earnings and profits.22
Although the court recognized that a loophole existed that allowed
the bailouts that Congress intended to prevent, it felt bound to a
narrow interpretation of the statutory language and legislative his-
tory2 29 In this author's opinion, this interpretation is unduly re-
strictive and inconsistent with the congressional intent to prevent
bailouts, which is evidenced not only by section 356(a)(2) but also
by the overall statutory framework of subchapter C.230
V. SUGGESTED APPROACH
One recurring theme of subchapter C is that distributions re-
ceived by shareholders of ongoing corporations are usually treated
as ordinary income. Imaginative plans that have succeeded in
avoiding this congressional mandate have usually provoked correc-
tive legislation.28
At the same time, some distributions from ongoing corpora-
tions will generate capital gains for shareholders.2 2 The price for
this favorable treatment is either a complete termination or sub-
stantial reduction of the shareholders' interest in the distributing
corporation or a complete termination or substantial contraction of
business at the corporate level. The rationale is that there is a suf-
ficient quantitative change in the shareholders' investment to jus-
tify treating the distribution as if it were received by reason of a
sale or exchange of stock.
227. Id. at 229; see also supra note 226. This was not inconsistent with the court's
holding that the exchange requirements of section 354 were met. This latter conclusion was
based not on the premise that no exchange was necessary. 55 T.C. at 229-30.
228. Id. at 230. The conclusion was also based on the legislative history of the predeces-
sor of section 356(a)(2), which referred only to the transferor in the example illustrating a
bailout. The court also concluded that "transferor" should be interpreted in the singular,
based on reading sections 354 and 356 together. Id.
229. Id. at 230-31.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 1-15. For an alternative view of congressional
intent in regard to the reincorporation-reorganization problem, see Robinson, Tax Interpre-
tation: Lessons from the Reincorporation Cases, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1981). Profes-
sor Robinson also concludes that the approach of American Manufacturing was correct and
that the functionally unrelated test "should be quietly abandoned." Id. at 45.
231. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Also relevant is the legitimate need of a business corporation
to consolidate, separate, recapitalize, and engage in other transac-
tions that do not disturb day-to-day business operations without
incurring adverse tax consequences. Absent a provision to the con-
trary, these transactions would require recognition of gain or loss
at the corporate and shareholder levels. Congress has, however,
deemed it inappropriate to impose a tax or to allow a deductible
loss under circumstances in which the shareholder's investment
continues substantially unchanged but in different form. The reor-
ganization provisions embody this intent.283 More important to
this discussion, if a shareholder withdraws liquid assets pursuant
to a reorganization, such amounts will usually constitute divi-
dends.'8 ' Most often, it is the shareholder or corporation that urges
the applicability of the reorganization provisions in order to avoid
recognition of gain. As noted earlier, " in the liquidation-
reincorporation situation, the taxpayers' and Commissioner's usual
positions are reversed-the Commissioner urging reorganization
status and the taxpayer resisting. This also occurs when the tax-
payer seeks a deductible loss or step-up in basis.
The liquidation-reincorporation transaction is another inge-
nious attempt to avoid the congressional mandate that distribu-
tions from ongoing corporations constitute ordinary income. As
discussed in detail earlier, a literal application of sections 331, 334,
351, 362 and 1012 affords the shareholders capital gains on the liq-
uidation and grants the surviving or continuing corporation a
stepped-up basis for the operating assets. 8 The Commissioner's
primary weapon against the bailout has been to recharacterize the
transaction(s) as a "D" reorganization by applying the step trans-
action doctrine. 87 More often than not, this argument has proved
successful with the resulting denial of favorable tax results. 3 8
Since the application of the reorganization provisions is
mandatory, a taxpayer's success in this area depends on avoiding
the definitional requirements of a reorganization. Although the
courts have been willing to construe most of the definitional re-
quirements broadly in order to find a "D" reorganization, 89 courts
233. See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 123-42 and accompanying text.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 109 and 166.
236. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
238. Id.
239. See supra notes 81-84, 94-95 and accompanying text.
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have strictly construed the control requirement. No court has ac-
cepted the reorganization argument when the shareholders of the
transferor corporation did not own at least eighty percent of the
transferee corporation. 240 The courts have not explained the rea-
sons for this strict construction, but it is probably due to the in-
elasticity of a quantitative term. This provides a strong incentive
for continuing shareholders to bail out the earnings and profits of a
corporation when they contemplate the infusion of more than
twenty percent new ownership. For example, assume that X corpo-
ration, solely owned by an individual, A, operates a small but suc-
cessful manufacturing business that has substantial earnings and
profits. X's key employee, B, wants to purchase a twenty-five per-
cent proprietary interest in X, and A agrees. A could sell some of
his shares to B, or B could purchase newly issued shares from X.
However, if A wanted to extract some of X's liquid assets at capi-
tal gain rates (and to obtain a stepped-up basis for the operating
assets), he could employ a liquidation-reincorporation. First, A
would liquidate X by distributing all of its assets to A. Then, A
would transfer the operating assets to newly-formed Y corporation,
while retaining all or a substantial portion of the liquid assets. B
would make a transfer to Y sufficient to obtain a twenty-five per-
cent interest. Since the control requirement is not met (A, the
shareholder of the transferor corporation (X) owns less than eighty
percent of the stock of the transferee corporation (Y)), no "D" re-
organization could occur. In any jurisdiction other than the Fifth
Circuit, this device would be successful.2 41
The Commissioner has been forced to advance other argu-
ments to deal with the liquidation-reincorporation bailout in this
situation. As noted earlier, Congress did consider, and at the last
moment failed to enact (because of "certain technical problems"),
specific legislation aimed at the liquidation-reincorporation trans-
action. 42 However, at the same time, it indicated its belief that the
"possibility of tax avoidance can appropriately be disposed of by
judicial decision or by regulation within the existing framework of
the other provisions .. . [of subchapter C]. 21 43 The judiciary has
responded by applying the step transaction doctrine, at least where
240. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 159-90.
242. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
243. H. CONE. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5280, 5301.
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the control requirement is met.2" When a "D" reorganization can
be found through the application of the step transaction doctrine,
the congressional purpose to prevent bailouts is accomplished ex-
cept when, as previously noted, the limit effectiveness of section
356 allows such a bailout, in whole or in part."5 But again, except
in the Fifth Circuit, this argument has been of no use where con-
trol was not present.246
The congressional invitation to handle the liquidation-
reincorporation bailout by regulation was answered with the pro-
mulgation of two regulations on December 2, 1955.
Regulation 1.301-1(1)247 provides:
Transactions treated as distributions.
A distribution to shareholders with respect to their stock is
within the terms of section 301 although it takes place at the
same time as another transaction if the distribution is in sub-
stance a separate transaction whether or not connected in a for-
mal sense. This is most likely to occur in the case of recapitali-
zation, a reincorporation, or a merger of a corporation with a
newly organized corporation having substantially no property.
For example, if a corporation having only common stock out-
standing, exchanges one share of newly issued common stock
and one share of and one bond in the principal amount of $10
for each share of outstanding common stock, the distribution of
the bonds will be a distribution of property (to the extent of
their fair market value) to which section 301 applies, even
though the exchange of common stock for common stock may be
pursuant to a plan of reorganization under the terms of section
368(a)(1)(E) (recapitalization) and even though the exchange of
common stock for common stock may be tax free by virtue of
section 354.
Regulation 1.331-1(c)248 provides:
A liquidation which is followed by a transfer to another corpora-
tion of all or part of the assets of the liquidating corporation or
which is preceded by such a transfer may, however, have the
effect of the distribution of a dividend or of a transaction in
which no loss is recognized and gain is recognized only to the
extent of "other property." See sections 301 and 356.
244. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 123-42 and accompanying text.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 159-90.
247. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(1).
248. Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1(c).
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The Commissioner has on occasion argued that these regula-
tions apply to liquidation-reincorporation. Both clearly would sup-
port characterizing, as a dividend liquid assets retained by share-
holders in the context of a liquidation-reincorporation transaction
(even when no reorganization is present), since most shareholders
would be unable to prove a business connection between the trans-
actions and the withdrawls. Even when a business purpose exists
for the intercorporate transfer of the operating assets, these regula-
tions effectuate the dividend provisions of section 301 when the
extraction of cash (or other assets) from corporate solution is unre-
lated to the remainder of the transaction. Moreover, the applica-
tion of the dividend provisions of section 301 avoids the sometimes
limited effectiveness of section 35649 when a reorganization is
found.
Surprisingly, the majority of liquidation-reincorporation cases
do not refer to these regulations, perhaps because in the majority
of reported cases a reorganization is found and dividend treatment
for the entire distribution to shareholders can be imposed under
section 356. Obviously, the regulations, or a theory consistent with
them, are needed to combat the liquidation-reincorporation bailout
where no reorganization exists or where section 356 is inadequate.
As indicated earlier, the Tax Court in Gallagher"5 O rejected
that part of section 1.331-1(c) of the Treasury Regulations that ap-
plies section 301 to liquidation-reincorporation. The court con-
cluded that Congress did not intend to treat liquidating distribu-
tions as dividends in the absence of a reorganization. The Fifth
Circuit is the only court that has accepted the underlying rationale
for these regulations. 51 Unfortunately, the court failed to rely on
or even to mention the regulations in reaching a result consistent
with them under its "functionally unrelated" doctrine. If it had in-
tegrated the treasury regulations into its opinion, the Fifth Cir-
cuit's bold step forward might have attracted more of a following.
Two influential commentators, without discussion, refer to the
treasury regulations and the "functionally unrelated doctrine" as
being representative of the same approach. 52
249. I.R.C. § 356 limits a dividend to the gain realized on the exchange and to only one
corporation's earnings and profits (when more than one corporation is involved). See supra
text accompanying notes 137-42.
250. Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962); see supra text accompanying notes
99-122.
251. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022
(1967).
252. B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 14-157; SURREY & WARREN, supra note
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The Tax Court in American Manufacturing has rejected the
Fifth Circuit's approach.2 " There, the court refused to look to the
earnings and profits of two related corporations to support divi-
dend treatment of all the cash distributed to the shareholders, dis-
agreeing with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the term "distrib-
uting corporation" in section 356 includes both corporations whose
earnings and profits were distributed. It also refused to find divi-
dend treatment under section 301, a result only available under the
regulations or the functionally unrelated analysis.
This result is surprising in light of the well-established rule
that a treasury regulation has the force of law unless declared inva-
lid, a finding possible only if the regulation is clearly inconsistent
with the underlying statute.2 ' Regulation 1.301-1(1) cannot be con-
sidered inconsistent with section 301, which merely provides (in
conjunction with section 316) for dividend treatment of distribu-
tions made by ongoing corporations out of earnings and profits.
Regulation 1.331-1(c) is, at first glance, inconsistent with section
331, which provides for sale or exchange treatment by shareholders
of the liquidating corporation. But Congress clearly contemplated
that benefit only for shareholders of corporations that have, in
fact, ceased to do business.2 55 The continuing shareholders in a liq-
uidation-reincorporation (whether or not they have "control" of
the surviving corporation) maintain an indirect interest in the op-
erating assets that remain in corporate solution. As shareholders of
what is, in fact, an ongoing corporation, they should be treated as
having received a dividend. Regulation 1.331-1(c) is consistent with
section 331 since it only imposes dividend treatment on sharehold-
ers of corporations that do not liquidate within the meaning and
spirit of section 331. Moreover, it is not only consistent with, but
effectuates, the congressional intent that is evident throughout
subchapter C: the prevention of bailouts of corporate earnings and
profits of ongoing corporations at capital gain rates.
Commentators correctly perceived both regulations' reference
to section 301 as indicating possible dividend consequences under
1, at 951.
253. American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204 (1970); see supra text accompa-
nying notes 191-230.
254. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
255. B. BrrrKEn & J. EuSTicE, supra note 3, 11.02. The Tax Court's decision in
TASCO, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 45-61, that section 337 does not apply
in a liquidation-reincorporation because of the lack of a "complete liquidation" may portend
a more flexible approach to this problem in the future.
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that section even where no reorganization is determined." 6 Fur-
ther, the reference to section 301 indicate that even where a reor-
ganization is found, a distribution attendant thereto may be taxa-
ble under section 301, as well as under section 356, where the
distribution is in substance a separate transaction. Application of
section 301 eliminates the problem under section 356 of limiting
the dividend to the gain realized by the shareholder on the ex-
change and restricting dividend treatment to one distributing cor-
poration where such distributions originate from more than one
corporation with earnings and profits.
Some commentators conclude that these regulations are inva-
lid because their promulgation lacked legislative or judicial author-
ity.2 ' 7 But Congress expected that the liquidation-reincorporation
problem could appropriately be disposed of "by judicial decision or
by regulation within the framework of the other provisions of the
bill."258 It is of no small import that the legislative history refers to
the "framework" of subchapter C and not to sections 301 and 331
alone. Certainly these regulations are consistent with the congres-
sional invitation to deal with the problem within the overall frame-
work of subchapter C, rather than through specific statutory
provisions.
The myriad of cases, both before and after the regulations'
promulgation, honors the substance rather than the form of trans-
actions, particularly when tax avoidance rather than economic
(valid business) purposes is the motivation for structuring the
transaction. The Supreme Court's decision in Bazley v. Commis-
sioner" ' would specifically support the regulations as would the
Fifth Circuit's decisions in Davant10 and Reef Corp. v. Commis-
sioner.2" 1 Again, it is unfortunate that the Fifth Circuit did not
link its "functionally unrelated" analysis to the regulations, since
the court's rationale parallels that of the regulations."2
256. See Hewitt, supra note 40, at 231-35; Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have the
Ground Rules Really Changed? 77 HARv. L. R v. 1218, 1226-31 (1964); Note, The Role of
the Continuity of Business Enterprise Requirement in Liquidation-reincorporations, 35
TAx LAW. 737, 770-71 (1982).
257. See supra note 256.
258. See supra text accompanying note 32.
259. 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
260. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022
(1967).
261. 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967).
262. One leading commentator assumes that Bazley, the "functionally unrelated" anal-
ysis, and the cited regulations are all different manifestations of the same doctrine. SURREY
& WARREN, supra note 1, at 955.
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The application of regulations 1.301-1(1) and 1.331-1(c) to liq-
uidation-reincorporation transactions does not mean that distribu-
tions to shareholders inevitably will receive dividend treatment.
Case precedent exists for applying the principles of section 302,s6
in interpreting section 356(a)(2) to determine whether distribu-
tions of boot in statutory reorganizations are essentially equivalent
to dividends. If a continuing shareholder's proprietary interest in
the transferee corporation (as compared to his interest in the
transferor corporation) has been sufficiently reduced to qualify for
capital gains treatment under section 302 as a substantially dispro-
portionate distribution, redemption, or a redemption not essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend, the regulations, by their own terms,
would not apply. Regulation 1.301-1(l) gives as an example of a
transaction to which it would apply a pro rata distribution of
bonds pursuant to a recapitalization. 2" The language does not re-
quire that all distributions deemed to be separate or unrelated to
another transaction be treated as a dividend. Only those distribu-
tions in the nature of a dividend would be affected. Regulation
1.331-1(c) states that a liquidation-reincorporation may have the
effect of the distribution of a dividend. That language would not
require dividend treatment if the shareholder could qualify for
capital gains under the section 302 test.
VI. CONCLUSION
Liquid assets retained by shareholders in liquidation-
reincorporations should be treated as distributions under section
301 unless the shareholders receiving the distribution meet the test
for capital gains under section 302, which is applicable to redemp-
tions. The test for the requisite reduction of ownership should be
made by comparing the shareholder's interest in the transferor cor-
poration (pre-redemption) against ownership in the transferee cor-
poration (post-redemption). Thus, in a case like Gallagher2 65 where
the continuing shareholders experienced minimal reductions or
even increases in their percentage of ownership in the transferee
corporation, dividend treatment would result. Where, however, the
reduction in ownership is substantially disproportionate 2 6 or re-
263. See supra note 127.
264. Tress. Reg. § 1.301-1(1). This example is obviously based on Bazley. The result has
been codified in section 356.
265. Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962).
266. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2); see supra note 5.
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suits in a meaningful reduction,6 7 sale or exchange treatment
would result. Capital gains should also result if the transaction was
accompanied by a substantial contraction at the corporate level
that qualifies the distribution as a redemption in partial liquida-
tion.26 8 It is strongly urged that any distribution that is made pur-
suant to a liquidation-reincorporation and that fails to meet this
congressional test 69 for capital gains treatment should be treated
as a dividend under section 301 as provided by the regulations.
267. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1); see supra note 5.
268. I.R.C. § 302(b)(4), with reference also to the five-year, two-business test of section
305(e).
269. Finally, it is important to note that Congress proposes to change the control re-
quirement for a nondivisive "D" reorganization from 80% without attribution to 50% with
attribution. Deficit Reduction Tax Bill of 1984, § 50. This proposed change in section
368(c)'s definition of control is applicable solely to nondivisive "D" reorganizations. This
change would greatly assist the Service in recharacterizing a liquidation-reincorporation as a
"D" reorganization by use of the step transaction doctrine. In most circumstances, therefore,
the Service's use of the "functionally unrelated" analysis will be unnecessary. The problem
that will still arise, however, is the dividend within gain limitation. Shareholders with high
basis stock may escape dividend treatment on all or part of the distribution because they
have a small gain or even a loss on the exchange. Shareholders who have a low or zero basis
in their stock are likely to have to report the entire distribution as a dividend. For a detailed
discussion of this problem, see notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
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